

1- In your work, you recognize that *arguing well* is much more than offering *good arguments*. You also state that while a virtue approach to argumentation is inadequate as a theory of argument appraisal, it can serve as “a valuable theory of argumentative practice”. Given that *arguing well* is a normative notion, and assuming that argumentative practice has a place and role in *arguing well*, what designs or principles may be offered for the contemporary (organized) practices of argument - such as intervarsity debates - for the latter to become conducive to arguing well?

2- Seeing that this is a tough question, we would like to offer one example for your evaluation. The example, rooted in the Munazara literature, concerns the *sequencing* of critical moves, e.g., deferring the moves with high illocutionary force, starting with mere objections. What can be said about the link or use of such ordering of argument moves, or their contribution, to cultivating argumentative virtues?

Please consider the following example: Upon receiving the protagonist’s claim and her argument in support of that claim, the antagonist can clearly identify: (a) one consideration that could cast serious doubt on the acceptability of one the protagonist’s premises, (b) a way to indicate how the protagonist’s argument could lead to an infinite regress, and (c) one valid argument whose conclusion contradicts the protagonist’s conclusion. Obviously, the antagonist could organize their argumentative moves strategically in various ways (a then b then c; or, b then a then c; etc.). In your opinion, what is the relation between how the antagonist orders her moves, on the one hand, and her argumentative virtues on the other hand?

[If necessary, we could send more literature, but we think the paper on sequencing we already shared with you provides the current state of knowledge available]

3- In contemporary debating tournaments, the participants are randomly appointed to certain positions, with the idea that this will contribute to their critical thinking and open mindedness. While this may be the case, in this kind of appointment of positions, there is the danger of producing what may be called “debate professionals” who, as it were, score points in a game. One alternative is to ask the debaters to serve as proponents of the positions they actually hold. What would be the benefits and harms of such a choice in terms of argumentative virtues? Which style of appointment would be more suitable for cultivating (which) argumentative virtues?