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Expert Consultation Questions for Dr. Dima Mohammed
by the ADAB team

1- Argumentation theory at large, Pragma-Dialectics in particular, is committed to the externalization principle which suggests targeting "the public commitments entailed by the performance of certain language activities" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003, 53). The principle in itself does not undermine the importance of states of mind, it simply requires that the study of argumentation should not deal with them since they are not readily accessible.

Assuming that states of mind play an important role in argumentation, it may be said that a commitment to the externalization principle sets the bar of the study of argumentation too low, giving up on important elements of arguing. This evokes the question of the scope of commitment to externalization: What, in your opinion, should the scope of the principle be? Would a narrow focus on "language activities," suffice for the study of argument in context?

What, in your opinion, is the strongest case against a commitment to the externalization principle? What sort of conceptual tools or theoretical resources hold the promise of paving the way for "accessing" states of minds? For example, resources and tools that could serve as umbrella categories for linguistic markers - which of course can be contextual and culturally-dependent - that can be associated with specific states of mind?

2- This question is on *sequencing* - how an arguer orders or arranges her critical moves. The Munazara protocol seems to suggest deferring the moves with high illocutionary force, and by starting with mere objections (We send you a paper on this, in case further information is necessary).

Please consider the following example: Upon receiving the proponent's claim and her argument in support of that claim, an opponent identifies: a) A consideration that could cast serious doubt on the acceptability of one the protagonist's premises, b) A way to indicate how the protagonist's argument could lead to an infinite regress, and c) One valid argument whose conclusion contradicts the protagonist's conclusion.

Obviously, the opponent could organize her argumentative moves strategically in various ways (a then b then c; or, b then a then c; etc.). In your opinion, how important is such organizing (*sequencing*) as a component of argumentation? Do you think *sequencing* could have any normative role?

Could the way in which an opponent organizes her moves help determine the type (inquiry, deliberative, etc.) of the argumentative engagement? How could it? Would it be possible to say that how an opponent organizes her moves is indicative of certain argumentative virtues or vices?

Finally, what, in your opinion, can be the connection between *sequencing* and argumentative style, understood as a link between the schemes of argumentation (symptomatic, comparison, causal) and the typology of standpoints (descriptive/evaluative/prescriptive)?

3. In "The Argumentative Potential of Doubt" the authors distinguish between ambivalent doubt (that is conducive to epistemic progress) and denialist doubt (that makes one vulnerable to deception). The authors also ask whether one should engage with denialist doubt, and distinguish between "confrontation" and "ignorance" options when it comes to denialist doubt.

How can we distinguish between good and bad doubts? Does the way in which one expresses a "beneficial doubt" have a role to play in the doubt being beneficial, or is the benefit of a doubt completely determined by the substance of the doubt?

If "the way in which" one raises a doubt has a role to play, then what are the modes of expression that fit beneficial doubts? And, what are the modes of expression that do not fit beneficial doubts? More generally, in an argumentative encounter, what should be the procedural requirements for the expression of beneficial doubts? Could you suggest any procedural regulation to unleash the argumentative potential of doubt?

Turning to bad doubts, such as denialist positions (climate denial, vaccine refusal), should these be banned altogether from public dialogue? Or, alternatively, should they be permitted on the condition that they are expressed in appropriate modes/ways?