Expert Consultation Questions to Prof. Katharina Stevens
ADAB team

Question 1

According to Pragma Dialectics' externalization principle, the study of argumentation should not deal with "states of mind" and be restricted to externalized commitments. We, like you (as per our Zoom discussion), think that leaving states of mind out of the picture is a mistake. How would you articulate, in more or less exact terms, that which argumentation theory misses when it abides by the externalization principle?

Having said that, one must recognize that unless we have some sort of access to states of mind, the pragma-dialectician can reasonably insist that while states of mind are important, they must be left out until we have a way of accessing them. How would you respond? (Do you think there are conceptual tools or theoretical resources that can pave the way for "accessing" states of minds, say ones that could serve as umbrella categories for linguistic or behavioral-markers (which of course can be contextual and culturally-dependent) that can be paired or associated with specific states of mind?

Question 2

You might recall from our Informal Logic submission the role of sequencing in Munazara literature (e.g., the antagonist organizing her argumentative moves according to their respective illocutionary force). To illustrative, consider the following: Upon receiving the protagonist's claim and her argument in support of that claim, the antagonist can clearly identify: (a) one consideration that casts serious doubt on the acceptability of one the protagonist's premises, (b) a way to indicate how the protagonist's argument could lead to an infinite regress, and (c) one valid argument whose conclusion contradicts the protagonist's conclusion. Obviously, the antagonist can order their argumentative moves strategically in various ways (a then b then c; or, b then a then c; etc.).

In your opinion, what is the relation between how the antagonist orders her moves, on the one hand, and her argumentative virtues, on the other hand? One can thought of such ordering in terms of "disciplined argumentation," a term used by Ian Kidd in his 2016 article where he argues that disciplined argumentation is conducive to the cultivation of humility, alongside other virtues (p. 399). How does your distinction between "roles" and "tasks" (Stevens and Cohen 2018, 2020) relates, if at all, to disciplined argumentation? For instance, does discipline occur through tasks and its impact manifests on one's ability to play certain roles? Any characteristics of such an argumentative encounter with others? (Kidd, Ian James. "Intellectual humility, confidence, and argumentation", *Topoi* 35.2 (2016): 395-402)

Question 3

One important challenge a virtue approach to argumentation faces is the development of a framework for appraising argumentation (process) and arguments (product). What ethical resources (deontological, utilitarian, care ethics) do you think are most conducive for serving that appraisal task? How do you think, if at all, such ethical resources could be operationalized? Finally, you mentioned that you adopt a pluralistic approach when it comes to drawing on ethical resources. Could you say more about the methodological guidelines for this approach? How would

you respond, for instance, to the charge that without a clear methodological guideline, pluralism might slide into self-serving eclecticism?

Question 4 (In the body of the email)
In our informal Zoom meeting you noted that treating Walton's dialogue types as exhaustive is western-centric. In this sense, dialogue types are one gate/opening for revising argumentation theory to make it more sensitive and inclusive of other traditions (more global).

   a. Could you expand a bit on this specific "gate/opening"? What other similar gates/openings in argumentation theory literature can you identify?
   b. Do you have any initial suggestions on how to revise the respective and relevant parts of argumentation theory to make it less western-cnetric and more global?
   c. Would you say that such gates/openings are the result of more basic and foundational assumptions, say, about rationality and reasonableness?