Response to questions
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Question 1
According to Pragma Dialectics' externalization principle, the study of argumentation should not deal with "states of mind" and be restricted to externalized commitments. We, like you (as per our Zoom discussion), think that leaving states of mind out of the picture is a mistake. How would you articulate, in more or less exact terms, that which argumentation theory misses when it abides by the externalization principle?

Having said that, one must recognize that unless we have some sort of access to states of mind, the pragma-dialectician can reasonably insist that while states of mind are important, they must be left out until we have a way of accessing them. How would you respond? (Do you think there are conceptual tools or theoretical resources that can pave the way for "accessing" states of minds, say ones that could serve as umbrella categories for linguistic or behavioral-markers (which of course can be contextual and culturally-dependent) that can be paired or associated with specific states of mind?

Answer to Question 1
I believe that leaving out "states of mind" like intent, motive, goal etc. makes it more difficult, if not futile, to develop an understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions of argumentation.

Normative theories like pragma-dialectics, Walton's New Dialectic, Johnson's Manifest Rationality or the epistemic theory of argumentation do not suffer from this loss because they are interested mainly in the epistemic-, agreement- or persuasion-oriented functions of argumentation. The suitability of an argument or an argumentative dialogue to make epistemic progress, to ground agreement or even to persuade is not dependent on the arguers' intentions. Whether a set of premises justifies acceptance of a conclusion, for example, does not depend on the arguer's wishes.

However, I think that argumentation theory as a whole does suffer from this loss because argumentation also has an important moral function: By arguing with someone, whether this is simply through presenting our own argument or through engaging with them in an exchange of arguments, we communicate to them that we value them in a certain way. I formulate this kind of valuing as respect for their standing as reasonable, autonomous beings, but it could also be understood differently from the perspective of different moral or ethical traditions. In any case, arguing communicates this because it invites participation: When we present an argument, that draws attention to the fact that we are trying to present reasons and it prompts the other to evaluate whether we were successful. And when we invite another into an argumentative exchange, we ask them to reciprocate. So, from my point of view arguing stands apart from other ways to make epistemic progress or to achieve agreement or persuasion in that it has this ethical dimension of communicated respect through the inclusion of another as a reasonable being.

Now, obviously, we can communicate falsehoods and we can make false invitations, and so we can argue in ways that really attempt to block the very participation we have invited or at least to

make it futile. But when we do that, we do something morally wrong – arguing in this way is a kind of betrayal. And therefore argumentation has an important moral dimension: Good faith arguing has ethical and moral value because it expresses respect and establishes respectful relationships, but arguing in bad faith does more than simply fail to generate this value – it is a rather considerable wrong.

I think that this alone is a very good reason why argumentation theory should be interested in developing an ethics of argumentation – a theoretical understanding of how arguers should behave in order to realize the invitation they issue when they argue. *Really* allowing others to participate in the process of argumentation can be very difficult; when our interlocutors are very different from us so that we have difficulty understanding each other, or when they are comfortable with very different forms of argumentation (e.g. adversarial or cooperative) than we are. *Just* avoiding fallacies is not enough.

However, ethics is a field where intentions, motives, goals and in general "states of mind" become really important. They are important for the evaluation of someone's performance – whether a fallacy was used intentionally or unintentionally makes the difference between a moral wrong and an understandable mistake. But they are also important in that arguers need to evaluate each other's states of mind in order to determine how they should act: Is my interlocutor being vague and confusing on purpose? Then they might be trying to trick me into accepting their conclusion and I might be justified in refusing to argue any further. Or are they vague and confusing because they are trying to formulate a thought, but they are having difficulty capturing what they mean in words? Then I might have an obligation to move away from the proponent-opponent back-and-forth we have been engaging in and instead spend some time helping them formulate their argument.

Now, as you say in your question, the argument that pragma-dialecticians use to support the externalization requirement is that we do not have access to states of mind. And of course it is true that I have a harder time determining whether your intentions are good than whether your shirt is blue. But as Aristotle famously pointed out: The methodology must match the subject matter. In other words: If the epistemic goodness of an argument can be evaluated without reference to states of mind, great – and if that allows for scientific exactness and clarity, even better. We should do that for evaluating the epistemic goodness of arguments then.

However, refusing to theoretically engage with the moral and ethical dimensions of argumentation because it is not possible to develop a method that is equally exact for evaluating arguments here seems strange to me. Imagine that we decided we should not ask for intent when it comes to murder because that is harder to determine than whether the suspect's finger prints are on the murder weapon. This would be absurd: Obviously it matters whether a person killed their grandmother by accidentally confusing the sugar with the arsenic, or whether they killed her because they wanted to. Excluding the moral dimension of argumentation leads to similarly strange outcomes. For example, Beth Innocenti recently published an otherwise excellent article on when it is appropriate to engage in extremely adversarial behavior like making fun of one's interlocutor, admonishing them etc. Her example was that the interlocutor had used an argumentative move that does in fact derail argumentation in a very thorough and harmful way. But she never considered whether the interlocutor had done so intentionally, or innocently – she

tried to evaluate whether it is appropriate to turn to admonishing or making fun based *merely* on the use of this move. That strikes me as absurd, just like it would be absurd to treat the accidental killer in the same way as the murderer.

So the fact that we cannot evaluate other's state of mind with absolute exactitude should not stop us from addressing it where it is necessary in order to make theory. We have developed ways to establish intent – in the law and in our everyday life, and we rely on them in order to determine how we should respond to our fellow human's actions. In ethics and moral theory, we rely on these ways. I see no reason why an ethics or a moral theory of argumentation should not do the same. After all, this does not take anything away from the "scientific exactitude" of argumentation theory's methods for evaluating arguments epistemically, or with respect to agreement and persuasion. It simply adds a dimension of evaluation that is (at least to me) extremely important. Then it matches the exactness of its method to the nature of the subject matter.

(I attached a draft of my ECA paper to the email, there I argue that argumentation has a moral function and that it is as central as the epistemic function – please do not cite from that yet, it is intended for a special issue next year. I thought it might be useful though).

Question 2
You might recall from our Informal Logic submission the role of sequencing in Munazara literature (e.g., the antagonist organizing her argumentative moves according to their respective illocutionary force). To illustrative, consider the following: Upon receiving the protagonist's claim and her argument in support of that claim, the antagonist can clearly identify: (a) one consideration that casts serious doubt on the acceptability of one the protagonist's premises, (b) a way to indicate how the protagonist's argument could lead to an infinite regress, and (c) one valid argument whose conclusion contradicts the protagonist's conclusion. Obviously, the antagonist can order their argumentative moves strategically in various ways (a then b then c; or, b then a then c; etc.).

In your opinion, what is the relation between how the antagonist orders her moves, on the one hand, and her argumentative virtues, on the other hand? One can thought of such ordering in terms of "disciplined argumentation," a term used by Ian Kidd in his 2016 article where he argues that disciplined argumentation is conducive to the cultivation of humility, alongside other virtues (p. 399). How does your distinction between "roles" and "tasks" (Stevens and Cohen 2018, 2020) relates, if at all, to disciplined argumentation? For instance, does discipline occur through tasks and its impact manifests on one's ability to play certain roles? Any characteristics of such an argumentative encounter with others? (Kidd, Ian James. "Intellectual humility, confidence, and argumentation", *Topoi* 35.2 (2016): 395-402)

Answer to Question 2:
A role is a combination of tasks, goals, typical behaviors, and norms – this is the case for argumentative roles as well as for other social roles. For example: If you think of a school-teacher, you can immediately identify what goals a person who is a teacher should pursue, what her tasks are, how she will usually behave. In addition: You can recognize that

someone is playing the role of teacher by how they behave: What tasks they take on, what behaviors they exhibit.

The same goes in argumentation. Take two different sets of roles: there are adversarial dialogues with proponent-opponent roles, and cooperative deliberations with co-deliberator roles. The task of an opponent involves identifying objections against the proponent's arguments, but not helping the proponent to make their arguments better. The tasks of the deliberator, by contrast does involve helping their co-deliberators with their arguments. Also, proponents and opponents are typically forceful in the way they present their arguments, and deliberators are more tentative – because the former understand themselves to be in a kind of battle and the latter expect cooperation.

This means that when we argue, we can communicate the kinds of roles we take – and therefore the type of argument we think we are in – through the *way* we argue; which tasks we take on.

If two arguers want to deal with an issue in different ways – I want to deliberate, you want to argue adversarially – typically the one in the higher social position gets to set the pace; because not arguing the way the other wants to argue might upset them, and the one in the higher social position can afford upsetting the other better. So: Different ways to argue translate into different role combinations, and roles translate into tasks. But we communicate and negotiate which roles and therefore ways to argue we will adopt through performing the role-associated tasks.

What this means is that the choice of sequencing can express a variety or virtues of vices. Presumably, we should argue in a way that gives our interlocutors a chance to get their reasons across, but by pushing them into an argument-type they are uncomfortable with, we can undermine this ability. So we can express respectfulness, or disrespect through our choice of argumentative moves.

Similarly, in some situations it is appropriate to get to the main point quickly, in other to take one's time and examine the subject in detail. So we can express patience, or rashness, or sloth.

I hope this makes sense: The choice of move shows the chosen role, and the chosen role can be appropriate or inappropriate for many different reasons, in different contexts. And that can reveal different virtues and vices.

Question 3
One important challenge a virtue approach to argumentation faces is the development of a framework for appraising argumentation (process) and arguments (product). What ethical resources (deontological, utilitarian, care ethics) do you think are most conducive for serving that appraisal task? How do you think, if at all, such ethical resources could be operationalized? Finally, you mentioned that you adopt a pluralistic approach when it comes to drawing on ethical resources. Could you say more about the methodological guidelines for this approach? How would you respond, for instance, to the charge that without a clear methodological guideline, pluralism might slide into self-serving eclecticism?

Answer to Question 3:

If you operationalize resources other than the resources developed by virtue ethics/epistemology/argumentation theory to evaluate arguments, then that is a pluralistic approach. Therefore, I find it hard to give a good answer to the first part of the question - except to say that I do not see a problem with saying that someone who does harm, or disrespects dignity without good reason displays vice.

I can, I think, give an answer to the second part: I generally try to show that a certain way to behave during argumentation is morally problematic or morally valuable from more than one perspective. So, for example, I try to show that being uncharitable in argumentation is both harmful from a consequentialist perspective and disrespectful from a deontological one. I think that this does away with the worry of self-serving eclecticism: Instead of making it easier for myself through cherry-picking, I try to make it easier for my audience by trying to meet them where they are (the example here is my paper on charity.)

I attached those papers of mine that are relevant for the questions and will explain better what I have said here. I hope that is helpful.

Question 4 (email body)

In our informal Zoom meeting you noted that treating Walton's dialogue types as exhaustive is western-centric. In this sense, dialogue types are one gate/opening for revising argumentation theory to make it more sensitive and inclusive of other traditions (more global).
   a. Could you expand a bit on this specific "gate/opening"? What other similar gates/openings in argumentation theory literature can you identify?
   b. Do you have any initial suggestions on how to revise the respective and relevant parts of argumentation theory to make it less western-cnetric and more global?
   c. Would you say that such gates/openings are the result of more basic and foundational assumptions, say, about rationality and reasonableness?

Answer to Question 4

What I meant with the gate/opening is the following: Unfortunately, Western scholars (me included) are self-centered, arrogant and constantly pressed for time. In some sense that is just part of the human condition, to a large part this is because of privilege and an unearned sense of entitlement. It should not be so, but it is. What this means is that it is easier to bring flaws in their own theorizing to the attention of Western scholars when it is possible to do this in a language or with tools they already understand/that they are already familiar with. The idea of dialogue types is such a set of tools. There is an opportunity to introduce Western scholars to new ways of arguing by offering them an analogy to dialogue types - showing them how they can think about other ways of arguing as different kinds of dialogue types. Of course this has its risks: The very form of a dialogue type is a Western form, so presenting non-Western ways of arguing in this form does them a measure of violence. It is therefore a question whether non-Western scholars want to go this way - and one that I cannot answer because I am Western scholar and therefore caught in my very Western perspective. Sorry, I hope this is somewhat helpful.

I am not sure how this would or will happen. I do believe it is necessary. I know that Christopher Tindale has made an approach with his Anthropology of Argumentation, but he has not, I think, engaged with the tradition that you are working on. The problem here is that if I, or anyone in Western Argumentation Theory provided a guideline for accomplishing this, the result would be something that is again heavily influenced by Western thinking - because the method of opening up argumentation theory to non-Western ways of arguing would itself be Western. So it is probably only possible to do this right through a kind of careful moving-towards-each other. I would think that a confident self-assertion by non-Western perspective would helpful, but again: I am caught in my own perspective.

There definitely is a problem when it comes to assumptions about reasonableness/rationality: Western argumentation theorists have a certain idea of what that means, and it is very difficult for them to let go of it. That leads to the exclusion of ways of thinking even from consideration. But: Expansions of the concept of reasonableness have already taken place - people used to think only deductive logic is truly rational, now there is a widespread acceptance of the cogency of narrative argument. So it can happen. The problem is, of course, that there cannot be a fixed methodology or way for it to happen because that would itself limit the insights in different forms of rationality we could acquire. So it has to be necessarily messy. At least that is what I think.

References
Stevens, K., (2019). "The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing", *Topio,* 38, 693–709.

Stevens, K., (2021). "Charity for moral reasons? – A defense of the principle of charity in argumentation", *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 57:2, 67-84.

Stevens, K. and Cohen, D., (2019). "The attraction of the ideal has no traction on the real: on adversariality and roles in argument1", *Argumentation and Advocacy,* 55:1, 1-23.