

## RESPONSE TO ANSWERS BY PROF. SHAHID RAHMAN FOR THE EXPERT CONSULTATION SESSIONS<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

When I first saw the term “dialogue logic”,<sup>2</sup> I was reminded of my Master's years as a fresh Comparative Literature graduate making his way into philosophy. I was trying to understand the different narratological styles of Plato and Aristotle. For me, the fundamental question was why Plato favors an almost novelistic style in which dialogues between people are related, and why Aristotle lectures in the first person, as a teacher. I must admit that I was tremendously prejudiced against Aristotle. His writing style and the way he represented the world did not appeal to me. It was very terse and dry. Socrates/Plato represented polar opposites. The oeuvre had its own universe where Socrates is the protagonist of a narration (*naql*).

We find *narratives* of Socrates in varying lengths. In some of them, Socrates also performs the role of first-person narrator of his own story:

I went down yesterday to the Peiraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration. I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent<sup>3</sup>.

My conclusion was this: The novelistic style skilfully invites our attention to *real life* where a debate between two parties is narrated for *ideas* to be realized (Oruç 2014). In general, Socrates takes the role of Questioner, and people in the group make shifts as the Answerer. The emphasis

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<sup>1</sup> For a more general introduction to ADAB project and Expert Consultations, please see the introductory sections of my response to the answers provided by Dr. Walter Edward Young. Moreover, before reading the present response, the readers are highly recommended to read Prof. Rahman's answers to our questions.

<sup>2</sup> In *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation* (2004). In the book, authors van Eemeren and Grottondorst mention the Erlangen School of Lorenzen and its “dialogue logic” among their inspirations (through the work of Barth and Krabbe (2010)):

Barth and Krabbe view a theory of rational argumentation as a finite collection of rules for the generation of rational arguments. Fallacies can thus be analyzed as argumentative moves that cannot be generated by the rules. Instead of the ad hoc declarations that the standard treatment usually provides, formal dialectics makes it possible to give systematic analyses of the fallacies. In the latter respect, the treatment of the fallacy that we offer in our pragma-dialectical approach fits in with the formal dialectical approach. (162)

More on fallacies in pragma-dialectics below.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0167>

on daily, actual life is also reinforced by explicit references to letting oneself to the wind of speech/argument. For instance, later in the *Republic*, Socrates says:

“Perhaps,” said I, “and perhaps even more than that. For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the speech blows, there lies our course”<sup>4</sup>.

The monologic demonstration glosses over the ramifications of the dialogic interaction, be them effable or ineffable.

Much like Socrates, I was not aware of where the winds of speech would carry me. I found myself writing a Ph.D. thesis on Munāzara and contemporary argumentation theories. Interestingly, contemporary argumentation theory and philosophy witness a fierce debate between the monologic and dialogic accounts. I think we can benefit from Socrates and Socratic dialogues in two ways. First, we can conceive Socrates as the *exemplar* frequently referenced in virtue science,<sup>5</sup> who has the necessary *ādāb* (epistemic and practical virtues) for human flourishing; i.e. the notorious Socrates as the *midwife of ideas*. That is, Socrates might help us understand the agential norms and the character traits vis-a-vis the act-based (e.g. logical, rhetorical, etc.) norms of argumentation. Second, we might aspire to develop an immanent perspective, i.e., a dialogical account of Munāzara. To do this, however, we should first critically examine Munāzara works from the premises of dialogical logic both philosophically and theoretically. In the context of my response to Prof. Rahman, I will focus on the latter way.<sup>6</sup>

This response is divided into four sections. In the first section, I differentiate between four uses/meanings of the term *dialogic*. In the second section, I talk about monologic-dialogic

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<sup>4</sup> ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη ἰτέον (394e). Both the original and James Adams translation is taken from Perseus: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text.jsp?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0167:book=3:page=394>

<sup>5</sup> As McZonaughy notes (2021, 212): “The dialectic of the *Republic*, on the other hand, is said to lead to knowledge by a conversion of the soul, but Socrates refuses to describe fully this kind of dialogue”. This is what I mean by the “ineffable ramifications” of the dialogic interaction. It was thanks to these ramifications that I started getting interested in the *Vedanta* and Ibn Arabian School. However, as there are a lot to learn from Prof. Rahman, I will leave the discussion of dialogic interpretation of Akbari school vis-a-vis the monologic account of Avicennean school for another occasion.

<sup>6</sup> We learn that the friends and students of Socrates would memorize the dialogues between him and the others. That is, they would not just mimic and memorize what Socrates did and behaved as the exemplar. On top of that, they also memorized the actual interaction between him and his interlocutors. This teaches us that virtue, or the development of virtues might not just be a monological endeavour. If it takes two to dance, it likewise takes two to be virtuous. Therefore studying the dialogical/monological debate should also teach us something about the ethical/agential norms -the first research agenda that I am leaving aside for the purposes of this occasion.

debate in contemporary argumentation theory and philosophy in general. In these debates, I show why I am inclined to side with the dialogists. I end the section with a discussion on “assumptions” where the formal pragmatism of Habermas (2014) and Dialogic Framework (Mc Conaughey & Clerbout 2022) complement each other. In the third section, I ask whether Munāzara is a monologic or dialogic approach to argumentation and debate. Then I list pro and con arguments for either interpretation, unfortunately without precision or confidence. The fourth section delineates the Munāzara procedure qua Samarqandī as briefly as possible. The section ends with the question of whether Munāzara can be considered as an argumentative perspective in which “the logic is already developed in an argumentative frame” (Rahman 2020, 135). If so, Munazara can be helpful in the task of developing “abstract structures to study ‘real argumentation’” (Rahman 2020, 135). In the conclusion, I ask further questions intended for collaboration with Prof. Rahman and the dialogists of Lille in terms of ADAB project and beyond: How to teach Particle Rules (*Partikelregeln*) in material, informal dialogues such as Munazara? How to decide on Structural Rules (*Rahmenregeln*) for a Munāzara-tournament? Finally, how can the Strategy Level help the judges of a Munāzara in determining the winner of a tournament round? In the Appendix, I provide a table comprised of different positions taken by intervarsity debating models such as British Parliamentary, American Policy, and World Schools. These positions mostly concern what I call the “institutional design” of a debate tournament and a round of debate. While there are some aspects of the institutional design that relate to claim-types and turn-taking rules i.e., local and global meaning, the institutional design is mostly related to issues such as the number of team members, the nature of a team, the preparation time given to teams, etc.

### **1. Four Uses of the Term Dialogic and the Aims of the Present Response**

Before starting it is necessary to make a distinction between the four senses of *dialogic*:

- The dialogic might refer to a *position* in contemporary philosophy. The dialogic here deals with the constitution of subjectivity, objectivity, and interaction. In this sense, a philosopher or a school of philosophy can conceive the constitution of self monologically or dialogically.
- The dialogic might refer to a *type* of argumentation theory. In this sense, pragma-dialectics is a dialogical argumentation theory, whereas the epistemological approach to argumentation is a monological one.

Lorenzon's dialogic logic could be understood as a particular dialogical type of argumentation theory (?)

- The dialogic might refer to a *framework* of argumentation theory. In this sense, the dialogical framework is not a logic along other logic(s) or an argumentation theory along other argumentation theories. Instead, the framework allows studying different theories of logic(s) and argumentation(s) (Rahman, McConaughy, Klev, and Clerbout 2018).
- The dialogic might refer to a *type* of pedagogy (Rapanta 2019).

So I wonder if we can think of dialogical logic as a particular logic that deals with meaning, validity, and interaction. Moreover, how can we analyze Munāzara from the particular conception of dialogical logic? I am not confident enough to claim that I will be able to clearly differentiate between these four senses of the dialogical. Most importantly, I readily confuse the difference between a framework and a type of argumentation. In my questions to Prof. Rahman for the *Expert Consultation Sessions*, I think, I made the mistake of confusing the senses of the term dialogic. For starters, I thought that the dialogic is a type of argumentation theory among other types; rather than a framework. Now I understand the counterpart for dialogic as a framework can be the model-theoretical or the proof-theoretical ones. However, the Expert Consultation Sessions with Prof. Rahman aims at an understanding of dialogic as a type of argumentation theory and practice. And it seems I share this confusion with some others: “Various studies have shown that the initial dialogical logic was not so much a particular logic than a logical framework in which a variety of logics could be developed, such as the original intuitionistic logic, classical logic, modal logic, to name but a few” (McConaughy 2021, 5). Having noted down my disclaimers I can begin.

We want to formulate a new intervarsity debating model based on Munāzara. Moreover, we want to establish an innovative training pedagogy and establish judging criteria to determine the “winner”. So according to the initial assessment, we might need to make certain theoretical and practical adjustments to the traditional Munāzara procedure. In this case, we would need to make such and such adjustments in the *play level* concerning particle rules and structural rules. Moreover, we can start thinking about the norms for the strategy level for argument assessment that will feed into judging criteria in determining the winner of a *Munāzara round* in a tournament.

Let me begin by elaborating on the monological/dialogical dichotomy in contemporary argumentation and philosophy. I hope it will help me clarify why I side with the dialogic camp. The elaboration will culminate in the third section where I will discuss the pro and con arguments for Munāzara in terms of monologic/dialogic dichotomy. Finally, in the fourth section, I will exemplify a traditional Munāzara procedure according to Samarqandī and later literature.

## 2. The Monologic-Dialogic Debate: The “I” Perspective or the “We” Perspective

When it comes to the argumentation theory, the monologic account holds that arguments are abstract objects that do not require arguers<sup>7</sup>. Notwithstanding its lip-service to the importance of dialogical interaction, the monologic account prioritizes the analysis of the product (taken as abstract objects<sup>8</sup>, i.e., the truth or acceptability of the propositions). Epistemologists argue that arguments have a standard function (Lumer 2005) or an intrinsic goal (Mohammed 2016). O’Keffe notes that:

Much of the work on argumentation appears to presume that the prototypical argument situation is one in which identity and relationship issues are suspended or ignored. This creates a stance in which the relational significance of messages is viewed as fundamentally irrelevant to the core questions of argumentation, and in fact as an intrusion of nonrational processes into rational decision making. (O’Keffe 1995, 786 as quoted by *Hinton 2022*).

I think the suspension also extends into the “the deontic undergirding of logic”<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> For neo-Platonists and Muslim Peripatetics demonstration or the scientific pursuit of causes, has metaphysical underpinnings too. In other terms, the demonstration is not merely a tool to be employed by all the sciences; it also has the alleged potential to *perfect* our sublunar minds. In the introduction of his famous al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya, al-Qazwīnī explains why he has written a manual on logic:

Whereas, agreeably to the opinion of all men of mind and virtue, the sciences, more particularly the incontrovertible sciences, are the highest pursuits in life, and whereas the professors thereof are the most noble among human beings, their minds being sooner prepared to be absorbed into the angelic minds, and farther, whereas it is impossible to comprehend the subtleties of sciences and to preserve the acme of their varieties except by the assistance of the science, which is called Logic. (al-Qazwīnī 2007, 2)

It was thought that once reason was perfected, it would be able to conjunct with the Active Intellect to the point where reason would become a replica of the intelligible realm. So much so that the reason could receive knowledge simply by contemplating *itself* without needing to establish a causal relationship between objects. So, it seems, in contradiction to modern monologic accounts, Avicennian tradition held that *there are arguers without arguments, not necessarily the other way around*.

<sup>8</sup> Recall *vujud al-zihni*.

<sup>9</sup> Taken from the paper uploaded to Academia: “Towards Immanent Reasoning II: On How to Play with Ansten Klev’s Development of Martin-Löf’s Dialogical Rules for CTT” by Rahman.

On the other hand, the dialogic account of argumentation as a type, more specifically pragma-dialectics maintains that arguments are sequences of events occurring between people (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Notice that, these accounts branch into quite different conclusions regarding argumentation, self, and interaction. To say in another way, the debate between two sides is actually derivative of their philosophical standpoints. Unsurprisingly, we find a similar debate in philosophy, as in dialogic as a philosophical position<sup>10</sup>. The monologic account is based on representation. Accordingly, the subject has the capacity to somehow represent the world and achieve a correspondence between the mind and the outside world. The questions revolve around the *direction of fit*: Is it from the mind to the outside world, or from the outside world to the mind? Let us call this account the “I” perspective.

The dialogical account, on the other hand, holds that the monologists suffer from mentalism, psychologism, and the *myth of the given* (Habermas 2014). The dialogists underline the interaction between agents through language as use. The emphasis on language and *language as use* leads to the conclusion that human beings are always already (*immer schon*) with each other. In the dialogical account, the object and subject are not naively presupposed to be given. Instead, the constitution of subjectivity and the representative function of language is tied to intersubjective communication, -its pragmatic function. The subject does not constitute the language or the world *monadologically*. On the contrary, language and interaction feed into the constitution of the subject. The representative or semantic aspect of language requires an equally important pragmatic component. The illocutionary force of a speech act exists with the condition that the addressee understands what the interlocutor communicates: “The representational and communicative functions of language mutually presuppose one another, in other words, they are equiprimordial” (Habermas 2014, 5). Following Habermas, let us call this account the “We” perspective.

Habermas argues that even after the linguistic turn, the old debates between idealism/materialism and rationalism/empiricism find themselves a new avenue. Instead of an account that secures the equiprimordial nature of pragmatics and semantics, we meet with a somewhat obscure pragmatization or semantization. In Prof. Rahman’s words:

However, the main philosophical tenet of dialogicians, Lorenz observes, is the rejection of the usual reductionist ways to understand the interface between semantics and pragmatics. Kuno Lorenz’s general dialogical principle is that the interface between

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<sup>10</sup> Admittedly I am not that well-versed, but I follow Habermas (2014) here.

semantics and pragmatics should be understood neither as the result of the semantization of pragmatics—where deontic, epistemic, ontological, and temporal constraints become truth-functional operators; nor as the result of the pragmatization of semantics—where a propositional kernel, when put into use, is complemented by moods yielding assertions, questions, commands and so on. (Lorenz 2011, pp. 519–520).<sup>11</sup> (“Towards Immanent Reasoning II: On How to Play with Ansten Klev’s Development of Martin-Löf’s Dialogical Rules for CTT” by Rahman)

For Habermas, the solution, e.g., the way to achieve the equiprimordial nature of pragmatics-semantics, or communication-representation is Kantian formal pragmatics. In this post-linguistic, post-metaphysical rendering of Kantian philosophy, there are intersubjective conditions of subjective experience. Accordingly, truth is an *idealization* we presuppose. For communication between parties to take place, they need to presume they are talking about “the world” and that they debate over the “same thing”. Truth (*Wahrheit*) is an idealization we intersubjectively presuppose with the help of rule-governed (*regelgeleiteten Handels*) intersubjective processes. That is, when we argue, we presuppose to argue about the same issue that resides in the same world. Argumentation is only possible when arguers *assume* that they talk about the same issue. The agent of this assumption is not the subject but the detranscendentalized (*Detranszendentalisierter*) Kantian subject: Without the addressee, my representation of a truth claim does not mean anything at all.

While I believe that idealization is certainly constitutive of meaning and thus the subject, it is not the end. Indeed, it is just the beginning. It seems the dialogists in the Lille, incorporate a similar “epistemic assumption” as a general principle for the local and global

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<sup>11</sup> It seems pragma-dialectics falls within the second camp. Moreover, Habermas seems to suggest that Searle’s pragmatics is also in the second camp. A further discussion point is the critique that Brandom faces from Rahman & McConaughy and Habermas. When it comes to Habermas, he makes the strong claim that:

Brandom combines Wilfrid Sellars’s inferentialist semantics step by step with a pragmatics of discourse in order to explain the objectivity of conceptual norms from the perspective of the intersubjectively shared “practice of giving and asking for reasons.” In the end, Brandom is able to do justice to the intuitions underlying epistemological realism only at the price of a conceptual realism that obliterates the distinction between the intersubjectively shared lifeworld and the objective world. This assimilation of the objectivity of experience to the intersubjectivity of communication is reminiscent of an infamous Hegelian move. (2014, 8)

Rahman and McConaughy’s critique of Brandom, on the other hand, focuses on the absence of play level:

Brandom’s approach only has the propositional level (i.e. his framework does not include the ontological level of the local reasons relevant for the backing of the proposition involved in the judgement). (Rahman, McConaughy, Klev, Cleurbout 2018, 11)

On the contrary Rahman and his colleagues argue that “not every sequence of moves in games of asking for reasons and providing them is necessarily inferential, only those plays leading to winning strategies are” (Rahman, McConaughy, Klev, Cleurbout, 2018, 270). The emergence of concepts, therefore, are not the emergence of concepts are “not only games of giving and asking for reasons (games involving why-questions), they are also games including moves establishing how is it that the reason brought forward accomplishes the explicative task. Immanent reasoning is thus a dialogical framework for games of why and how”. (Rahman, McConaughy, Klev, Cleurbout 2018, x)

meaning immanent to a play. The epistemic assumption by Sundholm solves the circularity problem and the immanent understanding of dialogue shows how to *operationalize* such an assumption:

The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. [...] In other words, though equalities of material dialogues are the result of the application of the Socratic rule, they are not “merely” grounded on epistemic assumptions. (Rahman, McConaughy, Klev, Cleurbout 2018, *ix*)

### 3. Munāzara: Dialogical or Monological?

It seems that Munāzara can be understood as a contemporary dialectical, procedural theory of argumentation. Moreover, as the ADAB project attests, Munāzara can also lay the foundation for a one-on-one, sequential dialogical interaction designed for competitive debating “sport”<sup>12</sup> much like British Parliamentary or Policy debate models. The heavy burden on the ADAB project is manifold: It should offer the attendants of debate tournaments training in logic and argumentation, without confounding the two in each other. This concern leads to the following question: *Is Munāzara logic superimposed on argumentation, or is it the dialogical constitution of logic?* Relatedly, *does the Munazara theory and practice help in the task of developing “abstract structures to study ‘real argumentation’”* (Rahman 2020, 135)? These are quite important questions and I am quite undecided & confused.

We learn from Prof. Rahman’s answers that dialogical framework is not a logic, rather it allows different logics, -and also maybe different dialectic(s)- to be conceived in dialogic principles (see the Appendix in Rahman 2020 by Clerbout). Nevertheless, it is still a question whether Munāzara is particularly amenable to a dialogical reconstruction in Lorenz and Lorenz’s line of thought that Prof. Rahman furthers with his colleagues and students??<sup>13</sup> I will refrain from a definitive answer. Unfortunately, I do not have a definitive answer either.

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<sup>12</sup> It is quite common to refer to competitive debating as a sport. I wonder whether we could understand it in terms of fully dialogical language-game?

<sup>13</sup> One might find this worry redundant. After all, dialogical framework(s) designed for formal or material dialogues allow all kind of argumentation(s) to be reconstruct dialogically. Moreover, as Krabbe (2013), formal pragmatics and pragma-dialectics are quite topical in character. However, McConaughy (2021) notes that Krabbe’s in dialogical reconstruction the validity of some arguments are assumed rather than being constructed through plays. This implies that not all dialogical reconstructions are the same.



Mc Conaughy (2021) shows that Aristotle's *Topica* provides ample room for such a dialogical reconstruction. If we recall that the founder of Munāzara, Samarqandī wishes Munāzara to take the place of *Topica* in the Post-Avicennian (*mutaakhirin*) philosophy, we can be hopeful. Nevertheless, Munāzara seems to be part of an overall attempt to “logicize” dialectics as well:

This remind us that Suhrawardī's work has been developed during the period when the logical turn of dialectics was taking place, during which the twelfth-century-CE eastern school of Raḍī al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī (d. 544/1149) students, especially Rukn al-Dīn al-'Amīdī (d. 615/1218), and others promoted the fusion of logic and dialectic theory – see Young (2021a,b,c) and Rahman&Young (2022, introduction). (Rahman and Seck *forthcoming*).

Let me list the pro and con arguments for the amenability of late-stage Munāzara as a particular type of dialogic logic<sup>14</sup>. In Munāzara the proponent must argue for her claim while the opponent tests whether

A) the premises are acceptable;

B) the argument is free from any deficiencies, and

C) the claim can sustain in the face of a counter-argument (Oruç, Üzelgün, and Sadek 2022).

During this testing process, both the proponent and the opponent are bestowed with some rights and they are restricted by certain obligations. The opponent, for instance, has the right and obligation to perform master category objections<sup>15</sup> namely objection (denial, man'), refutation

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<sup>14</sup> By late-stage Munāzara, I mean the highly simplified Munāzara commentary traditions based on Samarqandī's and Ijī's epistles, where, in contradiction to previous works, there is not an ambiguity between Munāzara in the way of *mantiqyyin*, and in the way of *usuliyyin*. In a workshop Prof. Necmettin Pehlivan argued that the ambiguity has already vanished by the time of Adanawi in the second half of 17th century. However the divide between the early and late stage Munāzara can also be related to different focuses and nuances rather than disagreements. This is why Young believes that even in al-Fanari's time we might witness the triumph of logicians (Young 2022).

<sup>15</sup> I owe the term to Young, who notes down that in Munāzara the many different objection types of *jadal* are reduced to three master category of objections. Moreover, according to McConaughy (2021), objections have a central place in the dialogic reconstruction of Aristotle's logic .

The dialogical approach to Aristotle's logic in general, that is, to syllogistic, dialectic, and scientific inquiry, provides a reading of the logical treatises unified by the dialectical context, which can take the form of debates or of (pre-causal) scientific inquiry. It puts the focus on objections and their rejection, understanding a *sullogismos* as the moment in an argument where one knows no objection against the conclusion will hold, provided was has already been posited. (11)

We see that Munāzara is explicitly founded upon a dialogical interaction through objections.

(inconsistency charge, *naqd*), and the counter-argument (counter-indication, *muarada*). This is because:

A) Unless incontrovertible a premise needs defense– the domain of objection.

B) The argument can not be flawed or fallacious- the domain of refutation

C) The argument should withstand arguments implying the negation of the demonstrandum (*madlul*)- the domain of counter-arguments.

The infusion of Aristotelian first principles vis-a-vis the centrality of objections with concerns of rights&duties seems to be a fertile playground for contemplation on *Munāzara* and the dialogic in its general sense; i.e. subsuming dialogic as type, as position, as a framework. The question then becomes whether we can understand *Munāzara* as a procedure that allows for the construction of meaning, validity, and the dialogical construction of logic. Or, maybe *Munāzara* does not allow to equiprimordially of logic and ethics. Instead, it imagines a logic+ argumentation?

What makes me suspicious of such concern is also evident in the *Munāzara* literature. In his *Qistas*, Samarqandī envisions *Munāzara* as an appendage to *qiyas*. Skimming through the pages, one can clearly see that *qiyas* here is understood in its *mantiqi*, rather than its *usuli* sense. Rahman and Young (2022) seem to hold that when it comes to the preceding *usuli* *jadali* theory, the corresponding dialogical meaning explanation is conspicuous. However, this is not so clear when we recall the *mantiqi* character of *qiyas* in al-*Qistas*. Samarqandī wants this new approach to correspond to *Topica* in the Post-Avicennian era, a book which he renders as an appendage to *Analytics [al-Burhan]*:

A custom of the ancients has been to append a section on dialectic (*jadali*) to the end of their logic books. But since, in our times, the Science of Juristic Disagreement (*‘ilm al-khilāf*) has made this superfluous, I have put in its place a canon for the protocols of dialectical inquiry (*ādāb al-baḥṭh*), and its proper ordering (*tartīb*), the proper formulation of argument (*tawjīh al-kalām*) and its refinement (*tahdhīb*). [These protocols] are, with respect to preserving the accurate explanation of meaning in verbal expression and writing (*al-taqrīr wa-l-tahrīr*), like logic (*mantiq*) is for reflection and thinking. By means of them, the road to what is desired is shortened, and the rationality of the argument is made pure. [*translation by Young*]

Note that he distinguishes between *ilm al-khilāf* and *Munāzara*. Moreover, he holds that *‘ilm al-khilāf* already satisfies the need for dialectics. Why develop a new discipline then? So, it

seems that Samarqandī does not envision a new discipline, what he talks about in the *Qistas* is really an appendage to mantiqī qiyas. So, it might be the case that, he thinks that a Munāzara is *logic + argumentation*. Even the idea to introduce Munāzara as an appendage to logic implies the first position<sup>16</sup>. Or, he conceives a new discipline, but there should be a change in character right? We see all these topics in jadal books and khilaf books already, so what is the point? Introducing, and formalizing the same thing through Aristotelian [*mantiqī*] syllogism?

There is a debate over the definition of Munāzara in the literature. Samarqandī defines Munāzara through reasoning<sup>17</sup>. Some later generations of scholars, however, reject this definition with the idea that the primary character of argumentation is interpersonal opposition/adversality (*mukhasama*) (Āmidī, 1900, 8) rather than reasoning. Interestingly enough, Samarqandī himself criticizes his teacher al-Nasafī for his definition of argumentation through reasoning (*nazar*). Accordingly, not all dialogues are argumentation. Argumentation exists when there is a difference of opinion. Otherwise, the discussion amounts to thinking-together (*mufākara*)<sup>18</sup>.

It is also questionable whether Samarqandī has some kind of early attempt at the pragmatic concept of meaning as use, which does not refer to the meta-linguistic realm. Recall that, Samarqandī talks of incontrovertible premises that can not be objected to. I think we can understand this in two ways:

1) Monological way. He is clearly not interested in the “linguistic turn” and his epistemology is foundationalist, pursuing the correspondence between meaning and the outside world. In this reading, Samarqandī’s deontic discourse in terms of the rights and obligations of

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<sup>16</sup> I am trying to as cautious as it gets, since Prof. Rahman seems to hold that conventional reading of Aristotle, and thus Muslim peripatetic tradition might be flawed:

In relation to *classical logic*, I will here take it as referring to the main-stream truth functional approach, with a model-theoretic semantics, a semantic notion of logical validity (true in every model), and a syntactic view on inferences as concerning derivations of content-free *formulae* (not propositions), whereby the system is sound and complete, if every syntactically valid derivation coincides with a semantic valid proposition and vice versa. Often with the term *classical logic*, the traditional Aristotelian syllogism is meant. Often too, the former and this second meaning are conflated, since it is (on my view), wrongly assumed that Aristotelian logic is truth functional (Rahman, from *Response to Expert Consultation Sessions*)

<sup>17</sup> In Young’s (2015) translation: Munāzara (dialectical disputation) is rational investigation (*nazar*) by way of insight (*baṣīra*), from both sides, with regard to the relation between two things [subject and the predicate, or the antecedent and consequent], as a means of making clear what is correct (*ṣawāb*).

<sup>18</sup> This debate becomes increasingly interesting when we learn that along side *bahth*, “*nazar*” is suggested as an alternative translation and title to Aristotle’s *Topica*. (Miller 2020)

the arguing parties are ornamental at best. The incontrovertible premises are propositions the content of which is somehow imported from the outside world. In this case, Samarqandī might be following the notorious “mentalist paradigm” and his approach seems to follow “psychologism”.

2) Dialogical way. The incontrovertible premises are those when employed as evidence or piece of evidence in a dialogue game, and they are *used* to lead to the silence of the opposing party in an instance of play. They, in a sense, belong to the “strategy level”, as opposed to the “play” level.

The opponent and proponent can play the game in such a way that one of the parties arrives at a premise to which the other party has no other moves left. If the premise yields the same conclusion in every game imaginable it attains the quality of being “incontrovertible”, withstanding -an arguably fallible,- falsification process. In this way of understanding, we are not obliged to refer to the meta-linguistic realm as we can explain incontrovertible premises as pieces of evidence that lead to the silence of the opposing party whatsoever the moves of the other party. They are the building blocks of winning strategies.

The silence of either party as a practical indication of “defeat” is elaborated in Samarqandī’s *Risala*.

If he brings a second dalīl, then the questioner will either deny it also, or concede it. If he denies it, then the aforementioned types of munāqaḍa and mu‘āraḍa and naqḍ are carried out for it. Likewise if he brings a third dalīl, and a fourth, or more. In such a case, either [the inquiry] terminates with the denier’s (māni‘) inexorable concession (ilzām) or with the causal justifier’s silencing (ifḥām). [This is] because if the causal justifier’s argument is blocked by man‘ and mu‘āraḍa, then [his] silencing will result. Otherwise, it must be that the causal justifier’s dalīls [either] end with something the acceptance of which is immediately necessary, or they do not. If it is the first, then [the questioner’s] inexorable concession (ilzām) is entailed. But if it is the second, then [the causal justifier’s] silencing (ifḥām<sup>19</sup>) is entailed. (Young 2015)

We have seen that Munāzara is clearly designed as the procedure for asking and giving reasons where each move in the procedure comes with certain rights and obligations. The opponent’s objection to a premise, for instance, has the illocutionary force of requesting argument (talab al-dalil) from the proponent. But I do not think it is that easy for me to pass on a judgment and

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<sup>19</sup> Can ifham be understood as *Lehr-Lernsituationen*. If so, can we say that the opponent has mastered an action schema (Rahman, from *Response to Expert Consultation Sessions*)

say that Munāzara has philosophical and theoretical components that make it a tool of “dialogical constitution of logic” or a theory where “dialogical use of rules of logic” is sought.

Looking at the issue from another angle might help us. An 18th-century Ottoman scholar Gelenbevī (1934, 32), defines Baḥth (inquiry) and Munāzara (argumentation) as the exchange of defenses (mudāfā) for the manifestation of truth. In this definition, it is not understood whether inquiry and argumentation are two different things or not. In response to this obscurity, Gelenbevī’s commentator explains that the connective *and* in “Baḥth and Munāzara” is for explication (1934, 32). This renders Gelenbevī’s words as such: “Know that, Baḥth, -that is Munāzara- is the exchange of defenses for the manifestation of truth”. In this definition, inquiry and argumentation are used interchangeably.

In the technical terminology of Muslim argumentation scholarship, Baḥth has three meanings: 1-*Predication* as in the example of “Rahmi is an emerging scholar”. 2- *Inference/Argument* as in the example of “Rahmi is technically an emerging scholar because he has completed his Ph.D., and all those with a Phd are considered emerging scholars”. 3- *Argumentation [Munāzara]* occurring between the proponent and the opponent (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, 12) on whether or not Rahmi is an emerging scholar. Jaunpūrī states that what is meant by Baḥth in the context of the science of Munāzara is either the inference or the argumentation. This is because, in an argumentation, parties will deal with inferences and the kinds of objections they receive. Argumentation will serve as a platform where an *inquiry* about a certain issue claim will be exhausted by the parties. The opponent will employ the available, legitimate kinds of critical moves in her arsenal: objection, refutation, and counter-argument. The proponent will be obliged to respond to these objections if they undermine her claim or arguments. Jaunpūrī, adds that, if the term Inquiry is understood as “Inference”, rather than Munāzara, some moves of the procedure will not be covered - most importantly, the objection in its particular sense, i.e., objection to a not-yet-defended premise. This kind of objection can only be understood as Munāzara, rather than an inference. So it seems that the dialogical encounter between parties will constitute the inquiry, in its third sense, i.e., Munāzara. The Munāzara procedure, with its turn-taking rules and prescription for virtuous conduct, will regulate how the overall machinery is to be operationalized by either party in the argumentative setting.

The product (inference) and process (Munāzara) ambiguity allows Munāzara scholars to divide an argumentation into three stages. This is because they hold that an inquiry has three components:

1. Preliminaries (mabadi) and determination of claim (tayin al-muddaa, i.e. making explicit the disagreement zone)
2. The means (awsat) which are inferences/arguments performed by the parties.
3. The ends (makati). These are the necessary premises and probable premises conceded by the other party. The argumentation should end with these two kinds of premises. (Jaunpuri 2006, 37)

Likewise, a Munāzara has three stages: the opening, the argumentation, and the concluding stages.

#### 4. Three Stages of a Traditional Munāzara according to Samarqandī<sup>20</sup>

The *opening stage* serves for the arbitration of the terminology that will be adopted afterward. The agreement is expected on both the meaning of the terms and the particular semiotic perspectives the terms refer to. With the assumption of the roles of the proponent and the opponent to start out, the proponent establishes the terms of the debate (taqrīr al-aqwāl). As specific terminologies adopted by different schools of thought are available, the proponent is expected to report (naql) the source of the terms (taqrīr al-mazāhīb). To give an example, the term argument (dalīl) is used equivocally between philosophers, theologians, and jurisconsults but there are drastic changes in their usage. Parties should clarify to which sense of the term they refer. As it is based on narration, the only obligation of the proponent here is to prove the authenticity of the report if she is requested to. By providing the terms of the debate and the source of the terms, the content and the form of the dispute (sūrah an-nīza') are established. At this stage, there are two legitimate moves for the opponent: (1) Request clarification for the terms; (2) Request proof for the authenticity of the report. For Samarqandī, in an ideal argumentation, the opening stage should not be overlooked. By reaching a certain consensus over the report that will be the foundation of the incoming argumentation stage, parties aim to prevent misalignments and waste of time (Samarqandī 1934, p. 126; Güney [Shirwanī] 2010, 108-9).

Samarqandī discerns the initiation of the argumentation stage directly with the proponent's argument for her claim. It is in the argumentation stage that claims are set forth, examined, and defended. The proponent can justify her claim through a syllogism be it deductive, inductive, or analogical. The opponent, in turn, may wait for the completion of the argument with its minor and major premises or object to one of the premises before its

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<sup>20</sup> The fourth section is from a paper submission we penned with Dr. Mehmet Ali Üzelgün. I added some new information for the purpose of my response.

completion. The first legitimate move of the opponent is objection (man') to one of the premises of the proponent's argument. The illocutionary force of objection is asking for defense (al-Āmidī 1900, p. 29; cf. Krabbe and van Laar 2011, p. 213). The objection can be performed both with support and without. An objection without support is called sheer objection (man' al-mujarrad). Objection with support (man' al-mustanad) can take three forms. The support might include consideration in the form of a question. We translate it as a questioning objection. The support might also be conditional. That is, the opponent states that she would grant the premise with a condition. We call it a conditional objection. Finally, the opponent might support her objection with the rejection of the contested premise. In that rejection, she is considered to have corrected a mistake in the proponent's premise (Samarqandī 1934, 126). Such objections can be translated as corrective objection (cf. Krabbe and van Laar 2011, p. 213).

To illustrate the differences let us employ Samarqandī's own example in a simplified manner (1934, pp. 127-130). In the example, the proponent claims that the cosmos is eternal:

Claim: The cosmos is eternal.

Minor Premise: Cosmos is the work of God.

Major Premise: The work of God is eternal.

The opponent:

I don't grant your minor/major premise (sheer objection)

I don't grant your major premise, why is it not possible that the work of God is transient?  
(questioning objection)

I don't grant your major premise. It would be true if God's creation is everlasting. (conditional objection)

I don't grant your major premise. The work of God does not have to be eternal. (corrective objection)

Although Samarqandī does not spell it out as such, a corrective objection is actually a counter-claim regarding a concept or judgment, in which the opponent believes that she is correcting a mistake in the argument or the claim of the proponent. Nevertheless, this counter-claim is still an objection with the illocutionary force of asking for defense. However, if the opponent starts to justify the claim through an argument that negates the initial claim or the premise, she is

considered to illegitimately assume the burden of argument, thereby committing usurpation (ğaşb)<sup>21</sup>. Counter-argumentation for the negation of a premise or claim is legitimate only when the opponent has justified her premise (Samarqandī 1934, 126). This latter statement is read by al-Shirwānī - whose commentary on Samarqandī has been a reference work since the 16th century - as an indication that although not denouncing, Samarqandī does not sanction an objection until the complete argument is presented with its minor and major premises (Güney 2010, 110).

When responding to an objection, the proponent can provide an argument for the objected premise. Or else, she can provide a new argument for her initial claim. In extremely rare cases, the proponent can object to the support of an objection, if this act saves the objected premise.

In Munāzara, the second legitimate move of the opponent is refutation (naqd). Whereas an objection addresses a certain premise constituting the argument, a refutation focuses on the argument overall. In other words, refutation is designated as an opponent's attack on the argument. Unlike in the case of objection, when advancing a refutation, the opponent is bound to submit evidence (Samarqandī 1934, 127). This can be performed in two ways: (1) The opponent shows that the argument is fallacious, (2) The opponent argues that the argument has a flaw (cf. van Laar and Krabbe 2013, 204). In the case of the exemplified argument for the eternity of the cosmos, the opponent might perform the second form of refutation as follows:

The opponent:

Your argument is flawed because it leaves out everyday events.

Everyday events are also the work of God.

Their transience is obvious.

As the proponent might be able to come up with another argument free from deficiencies, the illocutionary force of a refutation does not amount to the denial of the claim (Samarqandī 1934, 12). By performing a refutation, the opponent is considered to demand another argument for the original claim<sup>22</sup>. The proponent can either object to the refutation or come up with a new argument for the initial claim. If she chooses the first option the roles switch.

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<sup>21</sup> Is this the formal or Socratic rule for Munazara?

<sup>22</sup> We can also think the other way around and say that “it bestows the right to offer a completely new argument for the claim”.



The third legitimate move of the opponent is counter-argument (mu'āraḍa). In performing this move, the opponent grants the argument (dalīl) but objects to its demonstrandum (madlūl). By performing a counter-argument, the opponent elaborates why she is not convinced about the claim notwithstanding the validity of the argument put forward (Samarqandī 1934, 126). There are two perspectives in the literature regarding the focus and the illocutionary force of counter-argument. For Samarqandī and Curcānī, it constitutes an explicit attack on the demonstrandum and an implicit attack on the argument. Accordingly, the counter-argument is the annulment of the proponent's argument with another argument that negates it. For Sacaqlizade, on the other hand, a counter-argument addresses the claim. Accordingly, a counter-argument is the denial of the initial claim with an argument that negates it (al-Āmidī 1900, 87). In both cases, through the counter-argument, the opponent refers to the law of non-contradiction. If it is possible to negate the proponent's claim or the demonstrandum by arguing for its opposite then one of these contradicting opinions must be false<sup>23</sup>.

To exemplify:

The opponent:

We witness movement in the cosmos.

The movement is transient.

Conclusion: Therefore the cosmos is transient. (Samarqandī 1934, 127; Güney 2010, 112)

It is contentious whether the initial proponent - the new opponent - has the right to perform a counter-argument against a counter-argument (Mullā Ḥanafī 2014, 40; al-Jaupūrī 2006, 80-81). According to Samarqandī, the move is futile (Pehlivan and Çelik 2018, 436). Curcānī and Mullā Ḥanafī argue that it is legitimate. Objecting to an objection, on the other hand, is not considered legitimate. Instead, the objected premise should be justified with another argument (Samarqandī 1934, 127).

In the conclusion stage, it is determined whether the argumentation has been successful or not. Truth is considered to have been achieved when a party arrives at an argument the premises of which are incontrovertible. There are times, parties end the argument without going down to incontrovertible premises. It is also possible no truth or resolution is achieved as there are two other conclusion scenarios: The proponent might not further her argument. That is, in the face of a successful attack by the opponent, the proponent might be forced to remain silent. The same applies to the opponent. She might not further her attack on the proponent's defense, acknowledging her defeat through silence. Another significant indicator of the

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<sup>23</sup> Amidi notes that this is not the case in practical argumentation.

acknowledgment of defeat, relevant to many contemporary multi-level multi-issue debates, is the digression of a party from the issue of disagreement, moving into a claim that is different from the initial one (Samarqandī 1934, 127).

## CONCLUSION

I started my response to Prof. Rahman by differentiating the four uses of the term dialogic. I said that I was interested in understanding dialogic as a type of argumentation theory. However, as opposed to pragma-dialectics, this type of theory will be easily amenable to reconstruction in the dialogical as a framework. So, in this new Munazara, the meaning of logical constants will not be presupposed. The pragmatic component will not be merely ornamental. It seems such an argumentatively informed logic is also sought by Rahman (2020). Now, the question is whether Munazara provides such an argumentation theory. If not, what adjustments are necessary? I can not discern 1) whether the play in Munazara takes place according to particle rules, 2) which structural rules and therefore which kind of logic Munazara presupposes (minimal, intuitionistic, etc). I know that the dialogists refrain from prescribing a set of structural rules. But, as we aim for a complete dialogical rendering of Munazara as a particular type of argumentation theory and debate practice, we clearly need it. How to choose between different structural options? Moreover, apart from structural rules, there are “institutional design” that need to be determined: Should the Munazara take place between two teams or just two individual players? Should the Munazara debaters follow the strict turn-taking rules or should we allocate them a time (say, 2 mins or 5 mins for their “speech”) in which they do whatever they deem necessary? See the table in the appendix below for different positions in contemporary university debating models. I wonder how would Prof. Rahman fill the MEM column in the table. How can the dialogical approach help us determine the motion (thesis, claim) to be given to our debaters? That is, how can we make sure that the thesis given does not favor any side? Finally, how can the Strategy Level help the judges of a Munāzara in determining the winner of a tournament-round?

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**APPENDIX:**

*TABLE FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF MUNAZARA DEBATE TOURNAMENT*

<b>Model</b>	<b>BP</b>	<b>MEM (MUNAZARA ENGAGEMENT MODEL )</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Asian- Australian</b>	<b>Lincoln- Douglas</b>	<b>Ethics Cup</b>	<b>WSDC</b>
<b>Geography</b>	Mainly Europe + Africa but practiced everywhere		US	South-east Asia, Australia, New Zealand	US	Scotland	National teams based for highschoolers all around the world
<b>Individual / Team</b>	Team		Individual	Team	Team	Team	Team
<b>Number of Teams</b>	4		2	2	2	2	2
<b>N. of Team Members</b>	2		2	3	1	3-5	3

<b>Speech Time</b>	3-8		3-8	3-8	3-8	3-8	3-8
<b>Motion/Claim Type</b>	1.policy motion 2.analysis motion 3.actor motion		policy motion	1.policy motion 2.analysis motion 3.actor motion	policy motion	ethical problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>FACT:</b> Something is or is not.</li> <li>• <b>VALUE:</b> Something is of inherent worth or not.</li> <li>• <b>POLICY:</b> Something should be done or should not be done.</li> </ul>
<b>Based on...</b>	Parliament		Court	Parliament	Court	?	parliament
<b>Preparation Time</b>	15		10	30	5	no preparation time?	impromptu: 45-60mn given motions: few weeks before tournament
<b>Role of Judges</b>	a.decide on winner b.award speaker points c. give oral		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• stop a speech that runs significantly overtime.</li> <li>• eject</li> </ul>	a.decide on winner b.award speaker points c. give oral adjudication to	Case Analysis : How well the debater develops a case in	ask question (in all other formats judges are observers	a.decide on winner b.award speaker points c. give oral adjudication to clarify decision d. reprimand debaters for grossly abusive conduct.

	<p>adjudication to clarify decision</p> <p>d. reprimand debaters for grossly abusive conduct.</p> <p>e. stop a speech that runs significantly overtime.</p> <p>f. eject audience members who interfere with the debaters or</p>		<p>audience members who interfere with the debaters or ar.</p>	<p>clarify decision</p> <p>d. reprimand debaters for grossly abusive conduct.</p> <p>e. stop a speech that runs significantly overtime.</p> <p>f. eject audience members who interfere with the debaters or are disruptive.</p>	<p>response to the resolution</p> <p>· Organization; How well the debater organizes both the constructive and rebuttal speeches</p> <p>· Value Clash: How clearly the debater emphasizes the value being supported by his side and how that value is being</p>	<p>mainly but not in ethics cup)</p>	<p>e. stop a speech that runs significantly overtime.</p> <p>f. eject audience members who interfere with the debaters or are disruptive.</p>
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	are disruptive.				measured ( criterion) ·		
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<b>Fallacies (moves to be avoided)</b>	knifing Barracking	mukabara ghasb tahakkum hastiness talking too much talking too less failing to accept defeat  shifting the topic  rejecting previous commitments without acknowledging the change in their positions.  .....  .....	sandbagging	1. knives 2. barracking			1. knives 2. barracking
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