REFLECTIONS ON DR. YOUNG'S RESPONSE TO THE EXPERT CONSULTATION SERIES

Introduction

This is my reflections on the answers provided to us by Dr. Edward Young for our preliminary questions in preparation for the two deliverables of the ADAB project, namely White Paper on *ethical conduct in argumentative engagements* and the "Symposium on Ethical Debate Practices". As our goal is to make public the exchange between respected scholars/practitioners and the ADAB project, I start with an introductory note on Munāẓara. I then introduce the White Paper Expert Consultation Sessions. This is followed by a glimpse into Dr. Young's prolific career in the field of Islamicate Dialectics. With the necessary context given, I copy the questions we asked Dr. Young. Before reflecting on the answers, I elaborate on the reasoning & concerns behind the questions. Finally, I engage with Dr. Young's answers. I should note that he had provided numerous points of entry for reflection. Although I quoted his answers in many cases, the readers are advised to have a firm grasp of the written material linked to the present entry.

In my reflections, I will mainly have two objectives: Bringing in the issues discussed thoroughly by the contemporary argumentation scholarship. To this end, I will try to benefit from expert consultation exchanges with Dr. Gascón, Dr. Stevens, Dr. Mohammed, and Prof. Aberdein as well. My second objective is to a) highlight the challenges the ADAB project will face and b) make preliminary proposals.

An introductory note on Munāẓara

Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l Munāẓara is an argumentation theory and debate practice that emerged at the end of the 13th century. Its literary translation would be "manners of inquiry and argumentation" (Oruç 2022) or "protocols for dialectical inquiry and disputation" (Young 2022). Munāẓara was (Kızılkaya 2021) and remains among the instrumental disciplines one must master in their journey to knowledge and virtue. The overall goal in Munāẓara is the manifestation of truth (*iẓhār al-ḥaqq*) (Gelenbevī 1934, p. 32; Āmidī 1900, p.6). To that end, inquirers come up with claims and arguments that justify those claims. Simultaneously,

argumentation refers to an inquiry between two parties, namely the proponent and the opponent[1]. The proponent must argue for her claim while the opponent tests whether

A) the premises are acceptable;

B) the argument is free from any deficiencies, and

C) the claim can sustain in the face of a counter-argument (Oruç, Üzelgün, and Sadek 2022).

It should be noted, however, both parties engage not only in arguments but arguing. In fact, any move ranging from asking clarification for a term to the objection of a premise is detailed in the procedure. The opponent has a right to object to a premise simply by saying "I do not grant your premise". While doing so she does not come up with an argument by herself. In a nutshell, not just arguments but arguing itself is the unit of analysis for Munāẓara and it is a procedural, truth-seeking dialogical encounter between two parties.

The truth-seeking character of *Munāẓara* is inherently connected both to the rational (*'aqlī* and *uṣūlī*) norms and ādāb. The Aristotelian&Muslim rational principles and the phronesis (*fiqh*) attained thanks to transmitted [religious] sciences are the normative treasure throve of Munāẓara. In Munāẓara, ādāb refers not only to the observation of logical and dialectical norms; but also to the praiseworthy norms of conduct and the ethical interactive behavior, as emanating from a virtuous arguer (al-Qarsī 2018, p. 35). We will see below that the term Munāẓara is equivocally employed to refer to two meanings (al-Āmidī 1900, p. 8): The attribute of a proper arguer (*munāẓir*) and her act. In fact, what personally excites me in terms of our current project is the fluidity, -and even interdependence,- between the procedure and the agent, a point I return below.

Munāẓara flourished between the 13th and 19th centuries. However, the Muslim argumentation scholarship or the "Islamicate dialectics" (Young 2017) has a history of almost 1500 years, and compared to its long history Munāẓara is a relatively new evolution (Young 2022) or a revolution (Pehlivan and Ceylan 2015). To complicate matters more, Munāẓara seems to have gone through significant changes throughout the centuries as well. I will try to illustrate how these obscure and fluid boundaries influence the ADAB project.

The ADAB project and the "Expert Consultation Session Series"

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[1] I believe that the claimant and respondent are better translations, but to avoid any confusion, I use the proponent and the opponent for the time being.

The "ADAB" project takes its name and draws from the Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l Munāẓara. The project endeavors to address the contemporary state of debating culture by developing a Munāẓara-inspired argumentative engagement model (MEM) and implementing it in university contest debates particularly. Institutionalizing through tournaments and the attendant debate clubs, councils and other related bodies, intervarsity debates are one significant component of modern higher education. As the high levels of polarization might easily escalate into violence, it is vital to contribute to the betterment of argumentative practice through normative interventions. One way to achieve such intervention is by reimagining virtuous interaction and analytical competence. For this end, we draw on the Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l Munāẓara.

Jacob (2020) notes that, unfortunately, contemporary argumentation scholarship has little to no interest in public debate practice -or in his terminology "academic debate"-. Accordingly, two comprehensive volumes on argumentation theory reserve merely seven pages for the practice (p.1). It must be that academic/public debate is conceived as shallow, rather than a practice in which rationality and reasonableness manifest. Jacobs, on the contrary, argues that academic debate as a procedural model provides ample opportunity to study the norms and principles of rationality. Likewise, the ADAB project has various aspirations and goals but I believe the most significant is the idea that Munāẓara Engagement Model should be a public/academic debate model. The MEM will thus branch into clubs, councils, "tournaments" - or as we like to call them the "Meets",- training for debaters, coaching, and judging. This is particularly exciting for us, as each step will require extensive research and collaboration with diverse fields of expertise both in terms of the current project and in terms of later projects we plan[2].

Coming up with a new debating model and applying it in real life is a gradual process in which many conditions should be taken into account. The actual debate procedure with its rules, norms, etc is important, but it only constitutes the first-order conditions. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (i.e., Amsterdam school) holds that a critical discussion where the disputes would be resolved has three sets of conditions. The first-order relates to the

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[2] I view the current project as a preliminary attempt to determine the five components of a research program for Munāẓara; i.e. its philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical and practical estates. That is, while reviving Munāẓara, what will be our philosophy of reasonableness, what will be the theoretical model, and how will this model facilitate analyzing argumentation? Likewise, how can we do empirical research by employing Munāẓara and how can we make Munāẓara practice better? I believe the current project and the following project plans encapsulate the preliminary starting points to be further developed as a research programme in argumentation. For more on the issue, please see: (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 11-41; and also Oruç 2022, pp. 158-160).

rules, norms, and overall *machinery*. The critical discussion also requires second-order conditions that are related to the state of mind of the arguing parties and third-order conditions concerning the institutional context argumentation takes place (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 36). For a proper critical discussion, all three orders of conditions should be fulfilled (Gascón 2017, p. 714). The ADAB project and its subsequent projects need to take into account the procedure, the agent, and the institutional context. If it succeeds, the epistemic and moral environment will be a facilitating factor for human flourishing through the acquisition of reliabilist individual skills and responsibilist other-caring virtues[3] (for more elaboration on the issue, please refer to Gascón's answers to expert consultation sessions).

While working on the ADAB project application, we knew there would be some questions and decisions to be made. We also knew that the answers&solutions were complex. So, a creative solution was a prerequisite. We took inspiration from a project of Dr. Rashid Dar, and thus, decided to work on a "white paper" on the normative foundations of argumentation&debating and organize an international symposium on ethical argumentation. The idea was first to locate the fields of expertise the ADAB project requires and then request collaboration on tackling "the big questions" of arguing and the argument. Consequently, we determined that a hand was needed in three fields: the Munāẓara, contemporary argumentation, and debating. Having determined these three fields, we reached out to several experts. For the Munāẓara, Dr.Walter Edward Young, Prof. Shahid Rahman, and Prof. Necmettin Pehlivan were among the first scholars that came to our minds. Fortunately, these respected scholars were kind enough to accept our invitations. This is my reflection on his answers, which will hopefully contribute to further collaboration with Dr. Young in terms of the white paper and his take on the International Symposium.

A glimpse into Dr. Young's career in Islamicate Dialectics

Dr. Young has many significant contributions to Munāẓara. His field of expertise, though, stretches to all phases of *Islamicate dialectics*. While "Islamicate dialectics" as a term requires a lot of unpacking, suffice to say that it comprises, -at least,- three stages of intellectual development: *Ikhtilāf*, *Jadal*, and the *Munāẓara* (Young and Rahman 2022a). For the *Ikhtilāf* phase, he studied *Kitāb al-Umm*. Attributed to Imam Shāfi, the book contains numerous transcriptions of disputations between the earlier jurists. In his voluminous doctoral dissertation (Young 2012), which later turned into a manuscript (2017), he demonstrated that these

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[3] "The art (fann) of munazara is the name given to to rules/canons and principles. It can also refer to disposition (malaka), or the understanding (idraq) pertaining to the rules/canons." (al-Āmidī, 1900, p.8)

disputations contained a systematic approach to argumentation. He argued that this systematic approach later evolved into the full-system argumentation theory of *Jadal* and the establishment of law-methodology schools[4]. By analyzing the *working* argumentation system in the *proto-jadal* texts and the documented encounters, Dr. Young was able to show that Islamicate dialectics from its beginnings to later developments remains an unexplored potential.

It is important to note here that his general take on "Dialectics" is peculiar, and it can help the ADAB project:

> Dialectics, as I have elsewhere argued, constitutes a "formative dynamic;" it is something like a processing engine which, though not necessarily abolishing the plurality of opinions on any given matter, nevertheless assures that these pluralities, where they cannot be reduced, remain, both within themselves and in relation to each other, functionally rational and systematic. (2022, p.9)

As stated above the ADAB project has similar aims: We endeavor to institute an epistemic and moral environment where even the cases of deep disagreements do not lead to sophistry or vicious behavior. How much of our effort, at this earlier stage of the overall project, should be invested in the logical machinery (Young 2022c) and its processing engine is another issue. I will try to elaborate on the question throughout my reflections.

When it comes to Munāẓara as the latest stage of Islamicate dialectics, his contributions are numerous. He prepared a critical edition and a translation of *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Samarqandiyya* by al-Kīlānī; a commentary on Samarqandī's foundational *al-Risāla*. The translation allows the students to encounter the earlier phases of Munāẓara's development. He continued with a digital edition of Samarqandī's *Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar*, later revised for a print version (Young 2022c). Finally, he has worked with Prof. Shahid Rahman and other colleagues. In these works, they draw upon the *Jadal* and early stages of Munāẓara for contemporary use (see for instance, Rahman and Young 2022b). Dr. Young's prolific scholarship is also conspicuous in his response to our questions.[5]

Whereas the ADAB project focuses primarily on the latest stage of "Islamicate dialectics", i.e., the Munāẓara, Dr. Young benefits from his expertise in Islamicate dialectics overall and suggests that the answers we are looking for might not be that far away.

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[4] See this introductory video for more about law methodology:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aIicCDbR8Vw.

[5] It would be foolish to expect less from him.

Nevertheless, I should note that the reason why we have chosen Munāẓara is the idea that the theory is field-independent. Samarqandī, in his *Risāla* and *Qistās*, argues that with the Munāẓara procedure one can debate theology, law, and wisdom/ [philosophical] science. Dr. Young addresses our concerns in his response. Also in one of his recent papers, he reminds us that the history of Muslim argumentation literature is not limited to its latest r/evolution:

> We need look no further than the Islamic legal schools themselves, with their variant corpora of substantive rulings and indicants, and variant epistemological, hermeneutical, and rational-inferential tools in their methodological toolboxes, yet maintaining—both within each school and between schools—rational, systematic, and functional pluralism (2022, p.9)

The idea of rational, systematic and functional pluralism is quite important for the ADAB project. The "deep disagreements" (Fogelin 2015) are characterized by completely divergent propositional frameworks that do not seem to lend themselves to any agreement whatsoever. This might mean, however, we should focus more on the agent and the institutional context, rather than the propositional frameworks. That is, we should acknowledge the interdependence/fluidity of the epistemic and moral norms of argumentation, while also thoroughly studying the occasions where these norms seem to diverge. Nevertheless, just to exemplify what Dr. Young means by the methodological toolbox, I am copying below a table he recently prepared. The table normally consists of 23 qiyās-oriented objections (Young 2022d, p.27).

10	***al-qadḥ fī l-munāsaba bi-ibdāʾ al-mufsida al-rājiḥa aw al-musāwiya***: objecting to the suitability by way of introducing a preponderant or equivalent invalidating factor
	• Q points out a preponderant or equivalent *mufsida* (invalidating factor) which, by way of *muʿāraḍa* (counter-indication), negates the [property's] suitability (*munāsaba*)
11	***kawn al-waṣf ghayr ẓāhir***: the property's being non-apparent
	• example: R's legal cause (*ʿilla*) for validating a type of contract is satisfaction (*riḍā*), or his legal cause for justifying some legal ruling is intent / design (*qaṣd*), and Q objects that these properties are not necessarily apparent (*ẓāhir*)
12	***kawnihi ghayr munḍabiṭ***: [the property's] being imprecisely determined
	• example: R performs causal justification (*taʿlīl*) by way of underlying wisdoms (*ḥikam*) and welfares (*maṣāliḥ*), such as [avoidance of] hardship (*ḥaraj*), difficulty (*mashaqqa*), and suppression (*zajr*); and Q objects that these are not precisely determined (*munḍabiṭ*)
13	***naqḍ***: inconsistency
	• Q points out the existence of the legal cause (*ʿilla*) despite the nonexistence of the ruling (*ḥukm*); Q indicates R's inconsistency by showing that his legal cause exists without his ruling in a parallel case

Figure: 4 out of the 23 qiyās-oriented objections (Young 2022d, p.27)

What surprised me when I started studying Munāẓara with Seyda Xelîl Îbrahîm Banûkî was the succintness of the "novice level" Munāẓara texts of later Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l Munāẓara. They are as if 1-2 pages of pamphlets, and throughout history, there were many successful attempts to elaborate on the art of debate in a page, the most famous of which is that of al-Ījī' (al-Jaunpūrī 2016) and al-Birgivī's (Pehlivan and Çelik 2018) epistles. These epistles go through elaborate commentaries and glosses in the later centuries providing room for study and further abstraction. In one of his papers, Dr. Young also notes the simplicity of later Munāẓara:

> While exploring the intellectual history of Islamicate dialectics, I have often wondered how it was that the significant pluralities (in some cases hundreds) of discrete dialectical objections detailed in the "classical" juristic jadal works of al-Shīrāzī, al-Bājī, and others appeared somehow to have been reduced to a mere handful of objection types in the proto- / early ādāb al-baḥth—namely, that streamlined set of manʿ or mumānaʿa (denial) with / without sanad (corroboration) munaqada or (inconsistency) in either the particular (tafṣīlī) or collective (ijmālī) way, and muʿāraḍa (counterindication). (2022d, p.47)

I believe the ADAB project should opt for simplicity and succinctness as much as it could. We should be able to summarize the MEM with its procedures and virtuous conduct in a pamphlet that can be verbally explained in an hour. Having achieved this foundation in the later stages of the project, we can further develop the MEM with subsequent elaborations. Dr. Young argues that we should stick to the original as much as possible, and make ad hoc adjustments if necessary. He also provides us with a direction on that point in his answers. I wholeheartedly agree with him, albeit with some concerns regarding the second- and third-order conditions.

Dr. Young refers to objection types as master-category objections. In our paper with Dr. Mehmet Ali Üzelgün and Dr. Karim Sadek (2022) drawing inspiration from van Laar and Krabbe's work (2011; 2013), we characterized them as types of critical moves. These moves, by themselves, signify primordial Aristotelian principles such as non-contradiction; and they show how logic and dialectic are not mutually exclusive. Instead, the three master categories or types of objection (*man*ʿ), refutation (*naqḍ*), and counter-argument (*muʿāraḍa*) signify that

A) Unless incontrovertible a premise needs defense– the domain of denial/objection

B) The argument can not be flawed or fallacious- the domain of inconsistency/ refutation

and

C) The argument should withstand opposing arguments, the domain of counterindication/counter-arguments[6].

 Our duty, I believe, should be beginning with an easily practicable procedure (i.e., first-order conditions) and securing second-order conditions relating to the agent and the third-order conditions concerning the institutional context. In my reflection on Dr. Young's answers, I will be focusing on these two concerns primarily: First, we should have a humble, succinct beginning. Second, I will be drawing from the tension between epistemic and the moral components of argumentation. I have not fully made my mind up on whether or not, the moral and epistemic components should be differentiated or whether they should be thought together as Dr. Young has stated in his answers. While I believe there are cases where the epistemic and the moral norms are interdependent, it seems there are also issues that require serious reconsideration. The interdependence and fluidity of argumentative norms is a research agenda

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[6] Nevertheless, I should note a trend in the literature. Interestingly, the more the Munāẓara procedure becomes easily understood, the fewer examples it gets. This goes to the extent that Gelenbevi (1934) is compelled to write an epistle on Munāẓara where he *exemplifies* the procedure. This is clearly contrary to the Jadal and early Munāẓara era where there was an abundance of examples and issues. Samarqandī's goal was to universalize Munāẓara procedure, and make it a field-independent theory. I wonder whether this universalization, -what Dr. Young calls formalization- had undesired consequences.

for me, and I call my preliminary findings "argumentative holism", as an alternative interpretation of *argumentative perspectivism* (Wenzel 1990).

Below are the preliminary questions we sent to Dr. Young. I will try to explain our reasoning when working on these questions with the team. Later, I will offer my reflections on his answers.

PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS FOR DR. YOUNG

Munāẓara scholars assumed a wide acceptance of the Quran, Sunna, and Ijma' as sources of knowledge and validity. Such an assumption, however, cannot be relied upon in contemporary pluralistic contexts. Focusing primarily on practical-political debates that deal with "what we should do?" rather than "what we should believe?" we are particularly interested in the key considerations that need to be accounted for when designing a Munāẓara-inspired argumentation procedure for an international audience in diverse societies.

1. Do you think Munāẓara's goal of izhar al-haqq and ghalabat al-ẓann should be preserved, abandoned, or reformulated? Why? And, how?

2. Have any Munāẓara scholars suggested procedural changes, adjustments, or alternative interpretations of notions such as izhar al-haqq as a result of, or by way of accounting for, changes in the social-political-historical context? How could such changes, adjustments, or interpretations inform the contemporary efforts to transform Munāẓara into a debate protocol and software in use?

3. Keeping in mind our goals between the Munāẓara procedure and argumentative virtues, what would, for instance, be the relevance of taqrir/tahrir (as stated in Samarqandī's Qistas) and fahm/tafhim (as stated in his Risala):

4. Focusing specifically on the Munāẓara procedure, what adjustments would be necessary, useful, or worthy of consideration? For instance, (a) should disagreement be the only criteria for marking the beginning of a Munāẓara engagement? If not, then what could mark the beginning of Munāẓara?, and (b) Should reaching incontrovertible propositions be the only criteria that mark the conclusion of a Munāẓara engagement? If not, then what marks the end of Munāẓara?

We want to draw from Munāẓara to develop the Munāẓara Engagement Model (also referred to as *Munāẓara Vol.2*), but does it beg the charge of anachronism? This concern looms over all the questions we have asked Dr. Young. Munāẓara and Jadal might have been necessary and sufficient for their reign; but are we asking too much from this theory considering the state of debating culture and impoverishment of creative thinking? Inevitably, there is also a question of context: In Munāẓara, the goal of argumentation is the manifestation of truth (izhar al-haqq) or the preponderance of conviction (ghalabat al-ẓann). Are we living in a world where the purpose and function of argumentation are truth and objectivity? As we will see below, even contemporary argumentation scholarship is divided when it comes to "the question of truth" (Bottling 2010), or the primary unit of analysis for the argumentation theory. We will see that there are different perspectives on argumentation stressing: ɪ) the logical product, ɪɪ) critical resolution procedure, ɪɪɪ) the rhetorical adherence process (Wenzel 1990), and ɪv) character development and virtues (Aberdein 2010; Godden 2016).

In the face of many perspectives on argument and argumentation, as the ADAB project, should we move more towards the "adāb" component of Munāẓara, rather than its inquiry component? This is an ongoing discussion between the project team, and I personally defend "argumentative holism" against the contemporary dominant views on *argumentative perspectivism* (2022b). Accordingly, neither the ādāb nor the inquiry components of Munāẓara should be left behind. More on that below.

Munāẓara is a stable of the Muslim college, the madrasa. As an "obligatory" study subject every madrasa graduate should master, Munāẓara has flourished in an epistemic&moral environment aimed to create generations of polymath scholars who would have expertise in diverse fields ranging from mathematics to mysticism (Kızılkaya 20221). One such example is Samarqandī himself, the founder of Munāẓara. As a scholar adhering to multiplexity (Şentürk et all, 2020) for him, the truth had its layers. Inspired by a distinction Habermas (2014) made in his works, in my dissertation (2022), I discuss justification-dependent and justification-independent layers of truth according to Samarqandī. The justification-dependent layer certainly requires rational (*aqli*, *uṣūli*) procedures which Dr Young likens to "machinery" (2022c) and "processing engines" (2022). Samarqandī's Avicennean virtue ethics&epistemology, on the other hand, manifests yet another layer; i.e., kafsh/mushahada/spiritual experiential opening. This layer is only attainable if the self purifies itself from the vices and adorns it with virtues (al-Samarqandī 2020, pp. 71-72; see also Ṭāshkubrīzāde 1985, pp. 67-70), the result of which is an experience of spiritual opening. The

experience of spiritual opening[7] might be hard to attain in this project, but it is always good to aim for the stars![8]

While Samarqandī and Ṭāshkubrīzāde could not confine themselves to just one layer of truth, for contemporary argumentation theory, truth is a contested issue. It might be the case that Plato had envisioned the dialectical method as the forebear of truth (Oruç 2014), but in its modern "Renaissance" (Rigotti and Greco 2019), argumentation studies had a clearly different path imagined. This seems to be due to a division of labor between scientific disciplines where "positive sciences" do not so much rest on the Socratic method but experiments and other procedures. Representing a rhetorical approach, one of the seminal works of modern argumentation theory, the *New Rhetoric* (1969), contrasts argumentation with demonstration (p. 13). Indeed, the authors criticize the demonstrative tradition and blame Descartes for equivocating "certainty" with "rationality". The equivocation leads to the undesirable result of leaving out dialectics, rhetoric, [and poetics] from the domain of reasonableness. In response, Perelman and Tytica develop a theory of "practical reasoning", where plausibility and uncertainty will be given their reasonableness back (Perelman 1979).

The desire to leave out the demonstration from the domain of argumentation is also visible in pragma-dialectical argumentation theory (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Following Toulmin, pragma-dialectics differentiates between three views on reasonableness: "geometrical", "anthropological" and "critical". These three views determine what an argumentation theory will find "acceptable" -on the basis of what *a reasonable judge* finds acceptable either as a participant in argumentation or ad hoc evaluator of argumentation. Leading to a formal-logical argumentation theory, the geometrical conception of reasonableness deems an argument acceptable if the form is valid and the content is incontrovertible. The anthropological view of reasonableness, leading to a rhetorical argumentation theory, investigates whether the argument complies with the normative standards of the community in which the argumentation occurs (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 14). Finally, the critical view of reasonableness holds, "philosophically speaking" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 16) there are no objective standards for certainty. That is, there are no incontrovertible starting points, nor does an absolute authority exist to sanction

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[7] I tend to understand the concept "human flourishing" as a more humanist version of this ideal.

[8] While Samarqandī's recently edited and translated work (2020) shows us that he had a multilayered view of truth and self, I am not sure if his works on argumentation actually taps into these dimensions. Same applies for Ṭāshkubrīzāde. As we will see below, these authors might have believed that the epistemic and moral components can not be separated, and therefore securing the epistemic component already satisfies the moral component. It seems Dr. Young is also in the same page. I will discuss my position below.

any claim to incontrovertibility[9]. Pragma-dialecticians position themselves in the critical camp, and they argue that their critical perspective is in line with critical rationalism[10].

In the absence of philosophical certainty, critical rationalism leads pragma-dialectics to reject justificationism. Justificationism holds there are incontrovertible starting points that do not require justification[11]. This is dogmatism according to pragma-dialecticians:

> There is a crucial distinction between the geometrical philosophers who want to demonstrate how something is and the anthropological and critical philosophers who prefer to discuss matters. Philosophers of the former type try to prove their claims by showing step by step that these claims ultimately derive from something that is an incontrovertible certainty. Philosophers of the latter type attempt to convince others of their point of view by argumentation. They take into account that it is necessary to distinguish between two different positions vis-`a-vis the standpoint defended by the argumentation: the position of the person who wants to convince and the position of the person who is to be convinced. The geometrical view of reasonableness is an integral part of the demonstrative tradition, which is in fact anti-argumentative, although this fact is usually obscured by the veiled way in which this dogmatic view is presented (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 14).

Pragma-dialecticians do not reject demonstration as an argumentative practice, but it seems they are not content with the attitude, the state of mind the demonstrative tradition carries alongside. Therefore, for pragma-dialectics, the goal of argumentation is not the truth, but resolution of conflict *on the merits[12]*.

We have seen that two strands of "argumentative renaissance" in the so-called West, i.e., the new dialectics and the new rhetoric aim to distance themselves from the demonstrative tradition. This is not to say that in contemporary argumentation theories there do not exist any

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[9] Infact it is a derailment from critical discussion, and thus a fallacy (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p.166).

[10] But this is contested, see Lumer (2010).

[11] In a recent paper I elaborate on how Samarqandī makes use of the "Aristotelian finitude argument" in his argumentation theory (2022c).

[12] Nevertheless the epistemological approaches to argumentation argue that *on the merits* does not explain much:

> What makes a move reasonable? It is so if so deemed by a rational judge. What makes a judge rational? So far, we have no idea. Until van Eemeren and Grootendorst explain and defend their preferred 'philosophical conception of reasonableness' in accordance with which a rational judge will decide on the reasonableness of argumentative moves, they have not in fact articulated the extra criterion of reasonableness which they agree they need if their view is to have a normative dimension missing from rhetorical approaches to argumentation (Siegel and Siegel 1994, p. 283)

According to Siegel and Biro the circularity and emptiness of definition leave pragma-dialecticians in a dilemma. Either their theory is rhetorical, or they should advocate for the epistemic conception of argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach seems to have a sort of epistemic conception while also rooting for conflict resolution, which -Siegel and Biro believe- is nothing more than rhetoric. I think this verdict is quite harsh as it does not take into account the dialogic logic (Rahman and Tulenheimo 2009) or the dialogical roots of deduction (Novaes 2022).

objectivist (Biro and Siegel 2006), or epistemological (Lumer 2005) theories. Furthermore, there is even a virtue approach to argumentation (Aberdein and Cohen 2016) that has a clearly different conception of argumentation. I will return to this issue and situate Munāẓara in contemporary argumentation scholarship below[13].

In our questions, we implied the dichotomy between demonstration and argumentation institutionalized in the Renaissance of Western argumentation theories. Do we really need a theory based on truth and demonstration? I personally believe that one of the tenets of Munāẓara is its detailed rational base drawn from *mantiq* (logic) and *uṣūl* (legal theory/methodology). However, modern argumentation scholarship tends to be at best indifferent to questions of truth and demonstration. Furthermore, when it comes to the domain of "practical argumentation," -what Dr. Young suggests to call the "normative domain",- the authority of transmitted religious texts and the procedures thereof do not seem to conform to contemporary value-pluralism. In an epistemic and moral environment where even the basic Aristotelian principles of thought are open to debate, how can we make use of the argument-theoretical repertoire of Islamicate dialectics grounded in Muslim endoxa? Dr. Young answers that the repertoire or the machinery can be abstracted and in fact there is a formal evolution of Islamicate dialectics.

Before reflecting on Dr. Young's answers, I feel compelled to make another explanatory detour and touch upon the different stages of Munāẓara's development. As alluded to earlier, Munāẓara has hundreds of years of history. Most of its history remains in manuscript form and there seem to be different stages, -or at least,- different preferences of focus. In his speech delivered for the workshop ADAB project organized entitled "E-Workshop Excavating Munāẓara Manuscripts", Prof. Necmettin Pehlivan touched upon the different approaches of logicians and jurists to Munāẓara. He argued that up until Sāçaqlizāde, there was an ambiguity as to whether a logical or juridical approach governed respective authors. With Sāçaqlizāde, he argues, the logicians' approach triumphs over the jurists. There is also a marked difference in the post-Sāçaqlizāde texts. The logical-inferential relationships that have been developed in the late stages of Jadal, and early Munāẓara seem to have almost vanished, with some exceptions. Similarly, despite being not that far away from Samarqandī's time, the commentary tradition

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[13]Similarly rhetoric did have its place in the madrasa. Rhetoric (*balagha*) has been a "obligatory" field of study alongside *wad'* -also called the "Islamic pragmatics" (Ali 2013). To my knowledge, there does not exist a "canonical" work that discusses Balagha and Munāẓara together. However, I should also add that one of the famous "ādāb" of Munāẓara is the commandment of speaking succinctly. That is, one should speak as much as the situation requires, no more or less. This *adab* is studied extensively in Balagha literature (al-Taftāzānī 1891).

in line with al-Ījī does not seem to delve into logical-inferential relationships of entailment (talāzum), mutual negation (tanāfin) and concomitance (dawarān). Interestingly enough, in one of his latest studies, Dr. Young discusses a third branch of Islamicate dialectics, the qiyas-oriented dialectics of post-classical uṣūl al-fiqh (law methodology), to which al-Ījī was one of the important contributors (2022d). To explain my confusion and ignorance in emoji language: 😵😵😵

DR. YOUNG'S ANSWERS

In his answers Dr. Young reminds us that the contemporary demarcation between demonstration and argumentation does not apply to Islamicate dialectics or the general Muslim/Aristotelian philosophy of science. He provides his own translation to Samarqandī's *Qistas* (2020), edited and translated to Turkish by Prof. Pehlivan:

And in each one of these sciences, there are technical terms and conceded propositions which the inquirer into that science must concede in its regard, no matter whether they are objects of knowledge or of [mere] probability. That is because the indicants (adillāʾ) of every science have a final goal in terms of [epistemic] strength and rank, beyond which it is difficult to go; and that science's aimed-at objective is attained by it.

Take substantive law (fiqh), for example. For the utmost limit of its indicants is overwhelming probability (al-ẓann al-ghālib), but from this is attained the sought-after object of substantive law; namely, knowledge of a deed's obligation.

Such being the case, in each science nothing is demanded except what is possible in its regard. For in the sciences of Arabic syntax (naḥw) and substantive law, for example, demonstration (burhān) is not demanded. On the contrary, they are restricted to attaining probability (ẓann), and adopting what is more appropriate and better. Unless, that is, the causal-justifier (muʿallil) makes a rule of this and takes it upon himself; for in such a case, his interlocutor demands demonstration.

The indicants (dalāʾil) of the sciences might be arranged in terms of [epistemic] weakness and strength. The lowest of them in rank are the indicants of syntax, inflection, and what is connected to linguistic [sciences], then the indicants of substantive law, then of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and juristic disagreement (khilāf),

then of philosophy (ḥikma), then of logic (manṭiq), then of astronomy (hayʾa), then of geometry (handasa), which are the highest of indicants in strength and rank. (al-Samarqandī, 2020, pp. 500-503.)

Indeed, one of the first things a madrasa student learns in their "introduction to logic" studies is that logic has its preliminaries and objectives. The preliminaries are concepts and definitions. These concepts and definitions make the bones of the arguments we make. Every argument has content and form. The epistemic status of the content determines what type of argument it is (al-Abharī, 2016, 3). If the content is incontrovertible, and it follows the correct forms of reasoning with its modalities and temporities, then the argument is demonstrative. The argument is dialectical when it is constructed of premises that are commonly accepted among the general population, philosophers, and other experts in a field, or they are merely accepted among debating parties. The premises such as "Justice is good" or "Oppression is bad" are commonly held opinions (al-Abharī 2016, p. 21)[14]. Contrary to incontrovertible premises, it is possible to argue against them. That is, their inferential force comes from the intersubjective context they are employed in, not from their justificatory capacities themselves. While the incontrovertible premises are true in any case, the commonly held opinions can be true or false (Ahmet Cevdet 1998, p. 102). The argument is rhetorical when it "is composed of premises that are accepted because they are presented by someone whom one admires or; a *syllogism composed of probabilistic premises*" (al-Abharī, 2016, 21 (*emphasis added*)[15].

The Islamicate philosophy of science later formalized thanks to post-classical Avicennean Muslim Aristotelianism does not conform to the idea that demonstration is the only realm of reasonableness[16]. This allows Munāẓara to remain unharmed by the

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[14] It is not possible to demonstrate the middle term, the ontological and epistemological cause of connection between the minor and the premises in a commonly hold opinion.

[15] The argument is poetical when it consists of imaginative premises. The aim of a poetical premise is not the truth of the content but its pragmatic force. A poetic premise aims at creating an *affect* such as attraction or repulsion in the adresse.

[16] Nevertheless in his critique of logicians, Ibn Khaldun (1958) makes a similar point. He argues that the logicians have narrowed down logic to demonstration and thus leaving behind other syllogistic disciplines such as dialectics, and rhetoric. When in reality, -he argues,- these sciences deserve studying more than demonstration does, and their results tend to be more beneficial. Of course, his criticism is the criticism of a sufi, who does not believe in the metaphysical underpinnings Avicennean rationalism and essentialism:

> All the judgments of the mind are general ones, whereas the existentia of the outside world are individual in their substances. Perhaps, there is something in those substances that prevents conformity between the universal (judgments) of the mind and the individual (substances) of the outside world. At any rate, however, whatever (conformity) is attested by sensual perception has its proof in the fact that it is observable. (It does not have its proof) in (logical) arguments. Where, then, is the unequivocal character they find in (their arguments)? (1958, p.698)

contemporary theoretical controversies on the nature of reasonableness. Reasonableness has its degrees and argumentation theory can account for these degrees.

Having established different degrees of reasonableness, Dr. Young argues that we should indeed preserve truth and preponderance of conviction (ghalabat al-ẓann)[17] as the goal/function of argumentation. And yet, he reminds us of contemporary debates on the nature of truth and probability. We should preserve truth while also acknowledging the complexity of the issue:

> Or, perhaps, we might consider an "interchangeable parts" conception of MEMs, whereby certain fundamentals can be packaged or bundled separately, but then plugged together in different, functional combinations. For example, there can be multiple truth-theory bundles, classical vs. paraconsistent logic bundles, critical theory bundles (feminist, post-colonial, etc.), and domain (normative vs. positive / speculative) or even discipline-specific (law, medicine, politics, ethics, etc.) bundles. These could first be developed and defined, and then tested in a variety of functional combinations, for example:
>
> · a MEM which, in terms of truth theory, is based on consistency; and in terms of logic is classical; and in terms of critical theory is post-colonial; and in terms of discipline is for civil law debates.
>
> Or a MEM which, in terms of truth theory, is based on correspondence; and in terms of logic is paraconsistent, and in terms of critical theory is feminist; and in terms of discipline is for health and medicine.

To understand what Ibn Khaldun critisizes one can simply read the introduction of al-Qazwīnī's *Risāla al-Shamsiyya*:

> Whereas, agreeably to the opinion of all people of mind and virtue, the sciences, more particularly the incontrovertible sciences, are the highest pursuits in life, and whereas the professors thereof are the most noble among human beings, their minds being sooner prepared to be absorbed into the angelic minds, and farther, whereas it is impossible to comprehend the subtleties of sciences and to preserve the acme of their varieties except by the assistance of the science, which is called Logic (al-Qazwīnī, 2007, p. 2)

Note that he talks about the conjunction with immaterial intellects, i.e. the philosophical perfection ideal (al-Fārābī 2013, 85). The sublunar human mind is a possibility awaiting actualization. When it somehow makes conjunction (ittiṣāl) with the tenth intellect, it actively starts to apprehend the intelligibles/universals without taking into account the sensible objects (al-Fārābī 1938, pp. 31-33).

[17] Wididgo (2016, p. 5) draws from al-Juwayni and describes the term in the following way: "Through jadal, ẓannī knowledge or premises are tested. In turn, the tested and passing ẓannī knowledge is called preponderance of conviction (ghalabat al-ẓann), which is deemed to render a psychological certainty(yaqīn)." I will return to this point below.
I will return to the difference of psychological and epistemological certainty below, when I discuss the epistemic and moral components of Munāẓara.

I think this is a brilliant idea, and it is exciting. Hopefully, we can achieve such practices in the later stages of the overall reviving Munāẓara project. Admittedly, different epistemologies or logics did not occur to me as a concern so far. This is partly because of my conviction that classical logic is more than enough. Therefore, I do not have an answer that can adequately capture Dr. Young's suggestion. Fortunately, we have Prof. Shahid Rahman as one of the experts, and I have prepared the following question to be asked him:

> We also had the chance to benefit from Dr. Young's expertise. The questions we asked him how to tackle the issue of truth and whether there was a need to readjust/reformulate the Munāẓara procedure. We want to ask you about a concern that was brought up by Dr. Young. In his response, he reminded us of the development of new logics, for instance, the paraconsistent logic. Although this remainder is more than welcome, we fear over-complication. Eventually, the new Munāẓara Model will take university students as its participants:

> How should we account for the non-classical logic(s) in our procedure?
> Would it be an oversimplification to remain loyal to Aristotelian principles of reasoning (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle)?
> Do these principles ensure some sort of rightness/justice in issues concerning practical wisdom?

The reason why I brought up the issue of oversimplification is that the difference between epistemic and practical arguments comes from the Munāẓara tradition itself: In his commentary to Sāçaqlizāde's *Waladiyya*, al-Āmidī (1900) notes that the Munāẓara procedure's justificatory-function is domain-specific. Although the moves performed by the opponent remain the same (e.g. objection, refutation, and counter-argument), the justificatory/epistemic power of these moves varies. When arguing over an epistemic issue, the refutation and the counter-argument will simply destroy the argument they address. I believe this results from adherence to the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. For instance, in the case of a counter-argument, either the proponent's argument or the opponent's argument is correct. However, this is not the case for the practical domain. The argument might still be valid and sound even if there are counter-arguments to its negation. If this is the case, the Munāẓara procedure can at best act as a regulatory principle - it would determine the order of the debate without leading to preponderance of conviction.

In the epistemic domain, if the opponent levies a successful (i.e., true, correct) counter-argument, the proponent does not have the right to offer a counter-argument to the opponent's counter-argument, because this counter-argument will still be contradicted by the opponent's counter-argument. In the practical domain, leading to conviction, however, counter-argument against a counter-argument is allowed (Mullā Ḥanafī 2014, p. 40; al-Jaunpūrī 2006, pp. 80-81; Pehlivan and Çelik 2018, p. 436). The proponent has the right to offer a counter-argument to the opponent's counter-argument. In their explanations, the Munāẓara scholars argue that the proponent's second argument might be more powerful than the second one, or her two arguments together might ward off the opponent's counter argument (al-Āmidī 1900, 80).

The theoretical possibility of endless counter-arguments from both sides is a nightmare keeping me awake. This is why we asked Dr. Young about different ways to conclude a Munāẓara Engagement. He reminded us that reaching incontrovertible starting points be them epistemic first principles or transmitted-endoxon of Islam is not the only way that formally finishes a Munāẓara. Reaching incontrovertible starting points is the duty of the proponent, and if she achieves it the argument is over. The opponent's duty, however, is to critique the proponent's arguments to the point that she can not continue her argumentation. However, what about the practical domain where parties theoretically have infinite amounts of counter-arguments in their arsenal? Would it mean we should allow debate ad infinitum? While Samarqandī and his commentator al-Shirwānī (Güney 2015) are definitely sure that an argument in the theoretical/epistemic domain is finite (Oruç 2022c), but is it the same in the practical domain?

Let me expand upon the issue of the ending of debate; i.e,. the concluding stage of the Munāẓara procedure. Considering the theoretical possibility of endless counter-arguments, how will the MEM regulate a debate on the practical issue? One solution can be assigning a specific time for each party in their turn-taking. This is exactly what the British Parliamentary Model does. Below is a table provided by Tasnieem A. Hussain of Qatar Debates in preparation for another deliverable of the ADAB project, namely *the Position Paper on University Debates*. The table detail the turn-taking procedure of the British Parliamentary Model and what is expected from the speaker in each round:

Opening Gov	**Prime Minister:** Sets up the debate – Identifies the Problem, Outcome expected, and Solution proposed. Defines the topic. Provides a Model if necessary Gives the case structure and theme. Presents own arguments.	Opening Opp	**Leader of Opposition:** Responds to the definition (i.e. Accepts, Rejects or Clarifies) Refutes the PM's arguments. Gives the case structure and theme of their team. Presents own arguments.
	Deputy Prime Minister: Refutes LO. Reiterates and defends their first speaker's arguments. Presents own argument.		**Deputy Leader of Opposition:** Refutes DPM and PM. Reiterates and defends their first speaker's arguments. Presents own argument.
Closing Government	**Member of Government:** Deals with issues brought up in the opening half Defends their own side's case. Provides an extension	Closing Opposition	**Member of Opposition:** Deals with issues brought up in the opening half Defends their own side's case. Provides an extension

Whip Speaker:	Whip Speaker:
Presents a comparative overview of the clash points in the debate proving why their team's case stands and why the winning analysis that contributes to the win was brought in their teammate's speech.	Presents a comparative overview of the clash points in the debate proving why their team's case stands and why the winning analysis that contributes to the win was brought in their teammate's speech.

The procedure works with time-limitations rather than move-limitations. For instance, the Prime Minister speaks for 8 minutes and likewise, the Leader of Opposition responds in kind. In Munāẓara, however, there are not lime-limitations but move-limitations.

The proponent makes an argument for her claim. She might continue by defending the premises of the argument if the opponent allows her to. The opponent might object to the premises of the argument; refute the argument on the basis of a fallacy or inconsistency-charge, or come up with a counter-argument. I personally argue that the MEM we will devise should also operate in terms of move-limitations rather than time-limitations. In such a case, imagine that the parties debate over a practical issue. Theoretically, it is possible that parties will levy counter-arguments ad infinitum.

Contemporary debating models design turn-taking procedures based on time-limitations, and it is not without a good reason. The argumentation should end sometime. In the case of a turn-taking procedure based on move-limitations, it is possible that parties will keep the exchange ad infinitum, without conceding that they do not have any moves left, or even worse, the deep disagreement can not just be resolved. Dr. Young notes that reaching incontrovertible starting points and previously agreed-upon principles is the duty of the proponent, but I think this also applies to the opponent in a different way: The opponent makes her legitimate moves to the point that the proponent now is compelled to deny incontrovertible/previously-agreed-upon starting points, or lead to self-contradiction and other forms that signify the end of a debate (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, p.37).

Now, imagine a case where the proponent makes arguments and the opponent is able to shut them up. Then the proponent makes another argument, and again the opponent is able to shut them up. And this just continues. There is always a possibility of another argument justifying the claim or the counterclaim! The concluding of a debate, both in terms of procedural rules (i.e., first-order conditions) and institutional-design choices the ADAB project

needs to make (i.e., third-order conditions such as a move-limiting procedure or time-limited procedure, for instance) branch out to another third-order condition design choice. It concerns the role of the judge. Should the judge be in the "game" or should she be outside; giving post hoc judgments? As Dr. Young expressed in one of our previous discussions, the judge can be in the game as a football match referee is in the game. This would allow the referee to conclude the argumentation according to some rule. However, I do not believe this is a good idea. Arguers themselves should be able to say that the argumentation is over, or they "lost" the debate, at least in terms of that specific encounter they had, -this is what a virtuous debater would do.

The obscurity concerning the conclusion of a debate and the issue of time-limitations might be challenging but they also allow us to think about the first-order and third-order conditions of MEM. As stated above, I believe that the first-order rules and principles we have should be pretty basic; e.g. a pamphlet detailing the original, late-stage Munāẓara procedure revolving around the proponent's argument for the claim and the opponent's response with master-category objections/ types of critical moves (e.g. objection, refutation, and the counter-argument). These rules and norms should be accompanied by specific ādāb (norms and principles) for virtuous conduct, such as

"be succinct",

"be patient",

"don't be arrogant"

"do not make any inadmissible moves" (مَقبول)

"make sure your moves are in line with your opponent's moves (موجه)[18]"

 "don't shift the topic", and

"be courageous enough to accept defeat".

….

This simple and quite conventional ādāb can act as regulatory principles according to which the judges will decide the "winner". Notwithstanding their simplicity, they are quite hard to master and to turn into dispositions. In this approach argumentation would be an endeavor where the arguer should be in a state of mind where she knows when to speak and when to

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[18] For more on مَقبول and موجه please refer to (Gelenbevi 1934, p. 3-36; Oruç 2022, p.133). I will comment upon Dr. Young's discussion of sequencing (tartib) and relevance (tawjih) below.

remain silent (Taia&Oruç 2021). I think this would serve as an answer to Dr. Mehmet Ali Üzelgün's response to Dr. Young. Dr. Üzelgün writes:

> You hold Islamicate dialectics as a potent tool for developing, debating, and refining both the "positive domains of theology, philosophy, and natural sciences, as well as the normative domains of law and grammar". You also are confident in having "no doubt" as to its "capacity in / adaptability to contemporary theological, philosophical, and scientific issues".
>
> I think a distinction between epistemic (truth-seeking) and practical-political (agreement-seeking) is required to assess its capacity in / adaptability to contemporary issues.
> I wholeheartedly agree with your statement that "real arguments are not necessarily divisible between the normative and the positive", but from a slightly different angle:
> Present day's real epistemic questions/issues are EITHER completely removed from the public (e.g., do the sub-particles in the family of Higg's Boson mostly adopt a p-orbit or an s-orbit? Nobody has even a clue!), OR, if transformed into public discussions, have become political issues/contentions (e.g. does anthropogenic climate change exist?) As to the latter, crucially, the epistemic part of the problem is finished, it is demonstrated! Doesn't matter for about 40% of the Americans!
> Let's not go to post-truth from here, that's not my point. This is:
> Is it good to use softener after the detergent? Are free-range (code nr.1) eggs significantly more healthy than factory-eggs (code nr.2)? All these questions involve both epistemic and practical concerns/arguments, but they themselves are NOT issues of the epistemic domain, though they sometimes may appear so. Of course, what may be called "propositional truth" of statements would always be checked in the very course of argumentation. But when talking about the motions /standpoints /claims, domain of debate today seems to have shifted from the epistemic to the value-based, moral issues of disagreement. So, why insist on truth as the guiding light of dialectical engagements?

Dr. Üzelgün first notes the contemporary argumentation literature and the previously mentioned trend in its late stage to shift the focus from epistemic issues to moral issues of disagreement. It seems Dr. Üzelgün does not consider "rightness", and "morally right" as a domain with epistemic import. However, whatever the domain of argumentation be, by engaging in argumentation parties commit themselves to the truth/rightness of what they said. The commitment to argue, therefore, leads to a series of further commitments. For instance, if the party shows that elements of her opponent's argumentation are not tenable, the proponent is obliged to retract her argumentation. Argumentation, therefore, always includes an appeal to reasonableness through externalized commitments, be it in the form of truth, rightness, high probabilit,y or conviction. Now, if we consider Munāẓara and the MEM as an engagement in which parties are expected to know when to speak and when to remain silent, it becomes clear that there is an element of truthfulness/rightness that argumentation requires from the agents, whether or not they adhere to truth/rightness[19]. I think the critical move types or the master-category objections presuppose truth/rightness, regardless of argumentation's capacity to lead us truth/rightness. If the term truth/rightness has bad connotations, we can define Munāẓara as a process where parties try to manifest the reasonableness of their beliefs/concerns/conviction. I do not know, however, if there would be any changes to the argumentation procedure in these new definitions.

Please remember that in the beginning, I discussed the multiplex theory of truth, according to which there are layers to the truth. Whereas the first layer is concerned with reasoning and argumentation (i.e., justification), the second layer is only achieved as a spiritual experience. In his dissertation on Juwaynī, Widigo defines the jadal in the following way (2016; p.5).

> Through jadal, ẓannī [probably, subjective] knowledge or premises are tested. In turn, the tested and passing ẓannī knowledge is called preponderance of conviction (ghalabat al-ẓann), which is deemed to render a psychological certainty (yaqīn).

Remember that for Samarqandi as well, argumentation can successfully deal with different degrees of reasonableness and truth. Wididgo explains the degree of reasonableness (yaqīn) attained through jadal by likening it to Russell's psychological certainty (2016, 5):

> Bertrand Russell in the book Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits categorizes certainty into three, namely: logical certainty, epistemological certainty,

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[19] Nevertheless, I am really curious and excited for Dr. Üzelgün's suggestions for an agrement-seeking MEM.

and psychological certainty. The certainty is logical when "the class of terms satisfying the second is part of class of terms satisfying the first" like "x is an animal "is certain in relation to "x is a rational animal." The certainty is epistemological when the propositions or premises have "the highest degree of credibility, either intrinsically or as a result of argument." The certainty is psychological when a person "feels no doubt" of the truth of the premises or propositions that he has. See Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin LTD, 1948), 413-414.

By engaging in argumentation with a strong conviction -that, for instance, one should always use softener after the detergent or one should always consume free range eggs,- we imply that we are almost *certain*. We have thought a lot about the softener and we are open to debate with others. The certainty might not be objectively corresponding to the world, but this does not mean that personal convictions&concern earn a degree of certainty when defended by the proponent through externalized commitments.

I agree with Dr. Young in that the MEM should not abolish truth as a goal. His argument for the truth is particularly interesting:

> We should definitely preserve *iẓhār al-ḥaqq / al-ṣawāb* and/or *ghalabat al-ẓann*, etc. as goals of the MEM—it is mostly this objective which determines the moral superiority of dialectic and distinguishes it from sophistry and other, less ethical (or even downright unethical) forms of dialogical argument.

Here Dr. Young refers to the distinction made between quarreling and arguing proper. As stated above, contrary to a quarreler, the virtuous argues for the manifestation of truth. It is not important through whose voice the truth will manifest. A quarreler, on the contrary, aims to win and silence his opponent regardless of the truth of the matter. As we had the chance to meet for an informal discussion with Dr. Young, he knew that as the project team we emphasize the ādāb component. He adds that "Ethical argumentation method may require—to function as intended—something more than the mere creation of an ethics-cognizant theory". All argumentation theories & debating formats are prone to misuse. He holds that the epistemic component of an argumentation theory, - i.e., its engine, machinery- should be established properly, and this machinery is in fact conducive to our goal to have virtuous arguers:

> In my opinion, the ethic and the logic can't be separated: adhering to a truth-seeking ethic demands the practice of valid logic and accepted argument forms ("the good dialectic") and the avoidance of invalid logic and rejected argument forms—so a

vital part of any *Munāẓara* method has to be the defining and justifying of what constitutes valid logic and accepted argument forms.

I think his position is also supported by Mer'ashī[20]. He discusses an issue that I was also wondering about: In Munāẓara,- likewise in jadal,- there are the procedural rules&norms, as well as the "ādāb", -i.e., the rules&norms for virtuous conduct. Then the question arises whether these two norms are different from each other. To put in some other contemporary terms: Is the epistemic and moral different? Does the act-based and agent-based norms clash? Mer'ashī asks the same question and answers لعل آداب المناظرة تطلق على الوظائف أيض (It seems the term ādāb refers to the [procedural] duties as well" (Mer'ashī 2012, p.16). Another clue that indicates the ethics and logic can not be separated comes from the term Munāẓara. The term Munāẓara is equivocal: It refers both the action of "Munāẓara" (regarding together) and to "attribute" of a disputer *(al-Āmidī, 1900, 8).* That is, "Munāẓara" is also a state of mind that a debater has when arguing properly. If a debater partakes in a sequence of events that forwards doubts and reasons with an eye on truth, either to discover it or to manifest it to others, her actions are called "Munāẓara". (Gelenbevī 1934, p. 32). While showing her argumentative muscles, however, the debater neither aims for truth nor silences the opponent. Debating here is understood as a game, a pass-time, where one boosts his ego. Please note that we can take the truth out and replace it with "truthfulness", "reasonableness" or "conviction". If an arguer is sincere in expressing her reasons, only then her actions will facilitate a Munāẓara, with the condition that she is willing to change her opinions in response to the opponent's moves. Notice how Munāẓara scholarship views the first-order conditions and second-order conditions as interdependent. We will see that in many instances one can argue that act-based and agent-based norms share an ambiguity, in that you do not know which one comes first, the action or the agent?

THE AGENT-BASED AND ACT-BASED APPROACHES TO ARGUMENTATION: A DEFENSE OF ARGUMENTATIVE HOLISM

Contemporary argumentation theory has many different perspectives when it comes to the primary focus/unit of analysis. As Dima Mohammad succinctly reiterates in her response, the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical points of view to argumentation exist:

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[20] I am not sure if this person is the famous Sāçaqlizāde or another person.

Before elaborating on this, it is important to emphasize that the triad presents different perspective on the same practice (of arguing). As Wenzel puts it, "all arguments can be regarded as rhetorical, dialectical and logical phenomena" (2006, p. 9). Logic, rhetoric, and dialectics are "three different ways of thinking about argumentation (ibid, my emphasis) rather than a classification of different types of argument". In other words, the perspectives should be understood as "different points of view. Like the plans for a building, showing front, side and top views, the three perspectives discussed here reveal different aspects of any instance of argumentation" (ibid). Wenzel suggests that the three perspectives may be distinguished on the basis of the following elements: the practical and theoretical purposes relevant to each perspective; the general scope and focus of each perspective; conceptions of the argumentative situation or context in each one; the resources employed or examined within each perspective; standards of evaluation applied in each perspective; (and the) the roles of arguers envisioned in each perspective (2006, p. 13).

Generally speaking,

rhetoric helps us to understand and evaluate arguing as a natural process of persuasive communication; dialectic helps us to understand and evaluate argumentation as a cooperative method for making critical decisions; and logic helps us to understand and evaluate arguments as products people create when they argue (Wenzel, 2006, p. 9).

Contemporary argumentative perspectivism is in stark contrast to Muslim/Aristotelian conception of arguments. In the contemporary approach, there do not exist logical, dialectical or rhetorical arguments per se, rather, there are different perspectives to argumentation. In the Muslim/Aristotelian conception, however, there do exist different kinds of arguments with varying epistemic and pragmatic functions. And we have seen that Dr. Young also discusses them by translating a passage from Samarqandi.

Contemporary argumentation scholars on different camps start their attack on other perspectives by paying lip service to argumentative perspectivism. But the perspectivism they imagine, I believe is open to debate. In the Q&A session of his keynote speech for the 4th European Conference on Argumentation, Harvey Siegel criticized "argumentative imperialism". Interestingly enough, Siegel himself stated that for an action to count argumentation, there needs to be reason-giving in light of objective standards of epistemology; i.e, he is mainly concerned with arguments, rather than arguing. I am tempted to characterize

such positions as "argumentative reductionism" rather than "argumentative perspectivism". Nevertheless, my colleagues in the ADAB team believe that prioritizing one approach to argumentation does not count as reductionism. I think it is open to debate, or as the Muslim scholars would write in their books *wa fihi-n naẓar.*

Be it in the form of argumentative reductionism, or not, there is justified confusion and obscurity when it comes to argumentative perspectivism. Does it entail there exists this *entity*[21] called argument which can be understood differently? Or do different perspectives conceptually pre-determine what can be counted as a (rhetorical/dialectical/logical/agential) argument? I defend the first position, so there is this entity called the argument that exists independent of any perspective. In accordance with this hypothesis, I call for "argumentative holism".

I argue that argumentative norms are not mutually-exclusive; they, in fact, are interdependent. The norms I here take into account are logical (product-based), procedural (process-based), and agential (agent-based) norms. Of course, there are already successful studies on the interdependence of argumentative norms as seen in the case of pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren 2009), and Johnson's dialectical tier (2003). Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has first defended an ambiguity between arguments-as-product and argument-as-process showcasing how fallacies are not simply derivative of product-based norms[22]. In its extended version (van Eemeren 2009), where the notion of strategic maneuvering is introduced, pragma-dialectics included the rhetorical goal of effectiveness with the critical dimension of the joint pursuit of reasonableness. Johnson, on the other hand, has introduced a dialectical tier of arguments where a good argument is one that also anticipates and addresses the possible objections the proponent might encounter.

As there is a process-product ambiguity for pragma-dialectics, in Munāẓara there is a baḥth and munāẓara ambiguity. Gelenbevī, defines Baḥth and Munāẓara as the exchange of defenses (mudāfʿā) for the manifestation of truth (1934, p. 32). In this definition, it is not clear

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[21] This entity would be simultaneously characterized as having correspondence in the *external world (fi al-xaric)*,
 or as independent *mental existence (fi-l aql)*,
or existence in the mind (fi-l zihn),
or an intersubjective presupposition of communication (Habermas 2014).

[22] Following Hamblin, pragma-dialecticians argued against the standard treatment of fallacies where the interactional context is not taken into account (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p.158). In response, inspired by the Dutch linguistic convention where the word "argumentation" can simultaneously mean the product and the process -a convention that does not exist in English- it posits a product-process ambiguity (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger 2019, p.3).

whether inquiry (Baḥth) and argumentation (Munāẓara) are two different things or not. In response to this obscurity, Panjwaynī explains that the connective and in "Baḥth and Munāẓara" is for explication (1934, p. 32). This renders Gelenbevī's words as such: "Know that, Baḥth, -that is Munāẓara- is the exchange of defenses for the manifestation of truth". In this definition, inquiry and argumentation are used interchangeably. In the technical terminology of Muslim argumentation scholarship, Baḥth has three meanings: 1-Predication as in the example of "Şoreş is a resarcher". 2-Argument as in the example of "Şoreş is a researcher, because he has devoted quite a few of his years to work on his work". 3- Dialectical inquiry occurring between the proponent and the opponent, in which the opponent doubts or rejects the relationship between Şoreş and being a researcher (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, 12). Jaunpūrī states that what is meant by Baḥth in the context of the science of Munāẓara is either the argument or the dialectical inquiry. In an argumentation (Munāẓara), parties will deal with arguments and the types of objections they receive (dialectical inquiry). Argumentation will serve as a platform where an inquiry about a certain issue will be exhausted by the parties. The opponent will employ the available, legitimate kinds of critical reactions in her arsenal: objection, refutation, and counter-argument. The proponent will be obliged to respond to these objections if they undermine her claim or arguments. The encounter between parties will constitute the dialectical inquiry. The Munāẓara procedure, with its turn-taking rules and prescription for virtuous conduct, will regulate how the overall machinery is to be operationalized by either party

Note that, unlike Johson's dialectical tier, Munāẓara differentiates between the argument and the dialectical inquiry (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, p.12; Gelenbevi 1934, p.32) where the opponent has in her arsenal three kinds of critical moves: Objection, Refutation, and Counter-Argument (al-Samarqandī 1934, p. 126). While we can still have a traditional account of arguments as a claim and reason pair, we can argue that a good argument is one that has gone through the dialectical inquiry delineated in the argumentation procedure[23].

I believe that interdependence/fluidity is not just limited to product and process. Similarly, the fact that the term Munāẓara can both refer to attribute (*wasf*) and the overall machinery is also telling. The fluidity/interdependence can be seen in two ways: 1. Sequencing of the opponent's critical moves, and 2- Derailments from the procedure as character failures.

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[23] However, one should not forget that the term inquiry has three technical meanings. So argument and argumentation can be used interchangeably, but with only one of its senses. I speculate that the contemporary debates on the primary unit of analysis for argumentation misses the fact that argument and argumentation can be tied to interdependent/norms, while also branching out to certain other independent norms. Or, per mantiq and Munāẓara vocabulary, there is a partial overlap (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajh) between dialectial inquiry and argumentation.

Together with Dr. Üzelgün and Dr. Sadek (2022), we wrote a paper for *Informal Logic* where we argued for interdependence of procedural and agential norms.

Imagine that, upon receiving the proponent's claim and her argument in support of that claim, the opponent can clearly identify: (a) one consideration that could cast serious doubt on the acceptability of one the proponent's premises, (b) a way to indicate how the proponent's argument leads to a fallacy or inconsistency, and (c) one solid argument whose conclusion contradicts the proponent's conclusion[24]. Obviously, the opponent could order her argumentative moves strategically for some reason in various ways (a then b then c; or, b then a then c; etc.). In such a case, the proponent has a choice to make, and that opens a door to understand what she finds valuable in engaging argumentation. This is why, we argued that sequencing of the opponent's critical reactions gives cues to the interdependence between agential and procedural norms blurred through values of argumentation (such as coalescent-cooperation). These values are embedded in a procedure, demanding a virtuous arguer for their realization. One could see how these values, when realized by the agent, will necessitate certain virtues such as open-mindedness or honesty. Conforming to the procedure and, therefore, the prescribed values will earn one the title of a virtuous arguer, with the condition that these values have turned into certain virtues by *habituation*[25].

In his response, Dr. Young writes:

> Likewise, the importance of *tartīb* for ethical procedure should be self-evident. Among other places, it is pointed out in the *qiyās*-oriented objections chapters of many *uṣūl al-fiqh* texts, and of course *jadal* manuals, that Q's adherence to a strict order of questions / objections is absolutely essential to a constructive disputation. *Muʿāraḍa*, for example, comes at the end of most order-systems, since launching it earlier will

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[24] In the expert consultation sessions, Prof. Aberdein notes:

> I have two thoughts on this question, and I'd be interested to know if I'm barking up the wrong tree. Firstly, this trilemma reminds me of a similar trilemma in modern epistemology: responding to an argument by (a) undermining the protagonist's premisses; (b) undercutting the connection the protagonist draws from premisses to conclusion; or (c) rebutting the protagonist's conclusion by offering a new argument for (something implying) its negation. I associate this with the work of John Pollock (e.g. 1986). If this is basically the same thing as you are discussing, then that's a fascinating fact, of which I suspect most epistemologists are ignorant.Secondly, the sequencing question is also a fascinating one but does not seem to have a counterpart in modern epistemology.

[25] This is what the ADAP project aims for.

have disallowed R the full testing and expression of supporting indicants for his thesis, and the move will thus constitute not counter-indication (*muʿāraḍa*) but usurpation (*ghaṣb*) of R's role.

Derailing from the procedure is also related to agency, but this time in a negative sense.

The derailments from the procedure can be cashed out in agential terms, -in the form of a character failure. It's most clear in the case of *mukabara* (arrogance). Arrogance can be identified in an argumentative setting in many ways (Sājaqlīzāda 1872, p.69). Most of the time, these instances of arrogance are also traceable to derailments from the ideal procedure. It is in this spirit that I agree with Dr. Young, when he states:

> Ethical argumentation method may require—to function as intended—something more than the mere creation of an ethics-cognizant theory. We all know that there is a fine line between dialectic and sophistry, and that it seems to rely solely upon the disputant's intellectual humility, adherence to a truth-seeking ethic, and conscientious eschewal of fallacy. This is something inculcated at a socio-cultural and psychological level; that is, regardless of how ethically focused and satisfying an argument theory might be, it will always be prone to abuse or misuse by one in whom intellectual humility / truth-seeking ethic / eschewal of fallacy are lacking.

Due to the interdependence/fluidity of argumentative norms, many times sincere attempts to eschewal fallacy are enough to move appropriately the fine-line between dialectic and sophistry. Indeed in many times do the epistemic and moral components of argumentation seem to merge. This means that securing first-order conditions concerning the overall machinery can lead us to success in the second-order and third order conditions. A moral person is also an epistemic agent, and her sincere interaction with the other, under carefully established institutional context is enough for human flourishing and wisdom.

Although there is an interdependence between the logical and dialectical norms, we should not forget that dialectical inquiry and the argumentation can be used interchangeably in only one sense of the term.. They partially overlap, not altogether. This is why I agree with Dr. Stevens when she writes:

> Now, obviously, we can communicate falsehoods and we can make false invitations, and so we can argue in ways that really attempt to block the very participation we have invited or at least to make it futile. But when we do that, we do something morally wrong – arguing in this way is a kind of betrayal. And therefore argumentation has an important moral dimension: Good faith arguing has ethical and moral value because it expresses respect and establishes respectful relationships, but

arguing in bad faith does more than simply fail to generate this value – it is a rather considerable wrong.

I think that this alone is a very good reason why argumentation theory should be interested in developing an ethics of argumentation – a theoretical understanding of how arguers should behave in order to realize the invitation they issue when they argue. *Really* allowing others to participate in the process of argumentation can be very difficult; when our interlocutors are very different from us so that we have difficulty understanding each other, or when they are comfortable with very different forms of argumentation (e.g. adversarial or cooperative) than we are. *Just* avoiding fallacies is not enough.

As Dr. Stevens stated the moral and the epistemic can be two different entities as well. One can be morally right but epistemically incorrect for instance, as in the case of unconscious mistakes. Or one can be epistemically correct but morally wrong, as in the case of usurpation. This debate requires much further research for a firm resolution. However here I will suffice to say, argumentative holism should govern our overall orientation. I think that the multiplexity introduced above also supports this idea. There are justification-dependent and justification-independent layers to the truth. It might be the case that moral (agent-based) and epistemic (act-based) norms have diverging trajectories, but they might nonetheless meet each other again. To close with Ṭāshkubrīzāde:

> The first approach is referred to as theoretical reasoning (naẓar) or inference (istidlāl) and the second is referred to as purification of the self (tasfiya) or spiritual experience (mushāhada). The first is the level of well-grounded scholars, and the second is the level of people of truth and sincerity (aṣ-ṣiddīqīn). Each of the two approaches culminates in the other, and she who masters both is referred to as 'Majma' al-Bahrayn,- the merging point of two oceans. (Ṭāshkubrīzāde, 1985, 67; *translation adapted from*, Şentürk et al., 2020, 119)

Conclusion

We have seen that there is a partial overlap between first and second-order conditions. The procedural and agential; -or in Dr. Young's terms the processing engine and the ethical

considerations- might share the same normative source. This is why I agree with Dr. Young when he writes:

· Overall, I think *ādāb* procedure in all its stages is amazingly well-conceived, and it has certainly been thoroughly tested over hundreds of years. It is my recommendation, therefore, once again, that we should mostly adhere to some version of it, and make only ad hoc adjustments should the subsequent testing of a preliminary version of the MEM in various contexts makes it necessary.

Remaining loyal to the original *Munāẓara* as much as possible is a challenge worth undertaking. However, we should also think about the third-order conditions relating to the institutional context that will determine the grounds for analytical competence and human flourishing. The second- and third-order conditions for an ideal Munāẓara, therefore, require a lot more hard work, especially in cases where the epistemic and the moral clash. As the ADAB project, we have the responsibility to design a Munāẓara-engagement in such a way that reflects an ideal Munāẓara. Here are three preliminary proposals for the MEM (link to the entry "Three Proposals for MEM").

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